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Abstract
We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in
atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model
traffic in freight transportation, market oligopolies, data networks, and various other applications.
An atomic splittable routing game is played on a network where the edges have traffic-dependent
cost functions, and player strategies correspond to flows in the network. A player can thus split
it’s traffic arbitrarily among different paths. While many properties of equilibria in these games
have been studied, efficient algorithms for equilibrium computation are known for only two cases:
if cost functions are affine, or if players are symmetric. Neither of these conditions is met in
most practical applications. We present two algorithms for routing games with general convex
cost functions on parallel links. The first algorithm is exponential in the number of players,
while the second is exponential in the number of edges; thus if either of these is small, we get
a polynomial-time algorithm. These are the first algorithms for these games with convex cost
functions. Lastly, we show that in general networks, given input C, it is NP-hard to decide if
there exists an equilibrium where every player has cost at most C.
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1 Introduction
The problem of equilibrium computation, particularly efficient computation, is the cornerstone
of algorithmic game theory, and is an area where researchers have had many successes. In
many games, we have a good understanding of where the boundaries of computation lie,
including normal-form games [9], markets [12], and congestion games [11]. The study of
equilibrium computation has had a significant impact on algorithms, contributing new
techniques and complexity classes.
In this paper, we are interested in equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing
games (ASRGs) with convex cost functions. These games are used to model many applications,
including freight transportation, market oligopolies, and data networks (e.g., [7, 23]). In an
ASRG, we are given a network with cost functions on the edges, and k players. Each player
i has a source si, destination ti, and a fixed demand vi. Each player needs to transport its
demand from its source to its destination at minimum cost, and is free to split the demand
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along multiple paths. Each player thus computes a minimum cost si-ti flow, given the
strategy of the other players.
The fact that each player can split its flow along multiple paths is what differentiates
these from weighted congestion games. This freedom reduces the combinatorial structure
of the game, making ASRGs harder to analyze. For example, equilibria in ASRGs may be
irrational. While equilibrium computation in (unsplittable) congestion games is well-studied,
much less is known about ASRGs. In fact, properties of ASRGs apart from equilibrium
computation have been studied. We know tight bounds on the price of anarchy [7, 15, 27],
and can characterize games with multiple equilibria [4].
However for equilibrium computation little is known. We know of only two cases when
an equilibrium can be efficiently computed — when cost functions are affine, or when players
are symmetric, i.e., they have the same source, destination, and demand [7, 17]. These
conditions are hardly ever met in practice. We know of no hardness results for this problem.
A number of iterative algorithms for equilibrium computation are proposed, and sufficient
conditions for convergence are given by Marcotte [22]. Further, it is implicit in a paper by
Swamy that one can compute equilibrium efficiently, given the total flow on each edge [30].
Computing equilibria in ASRGs is an interesting theoretical challenge as well. In some
regards, properties of pure Nash equilibria in ASRGs resemble mixed Nash equilibria in
games. For example, an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists [25]. For many games
with this property, local search algorithms are known that converge to an equilibrium (e.g.,
congestion games). However in ASRGs we do not know of any such algorithms.
In this work, we focus on polynomial time algorithms for computing equilibria in ASRGs
with general convex costs on parallel edges. Parallel edges are interesting because a number
of applications can be modeled using parallel edges, such as load balancing across servers [29],
and in traffic models [16]. Further, many results were first obtained for graphs consisting
of parallel edges and then extended (e.g., results on the price of collusion [18], extended to
series-parallel graphs [5], or on the price of anarchy [21, 6]). These are thus a natural starting
point to study equilibrium computation. We believe it likely that some of our structural
results extend beyond parallel edges, to nearly-parallel and series-parallel graphs.
Our Contribution. For ASRGs with convex costs on parallel edges, we give two algorithms.
Our first algorithm computes an equilibrium1 in time O ((log |I|)n), where |I| is the input
size and n is the number of players. If the number of players is near-logarithmic in the input
size, i.e., O(log |I|/ log log |I|), this gives a polynomial time algorithm. Our algorithm is
based on the idea of reducing equilibrium computation to guessing the marginal costs of
the players at equilibrium. The marginal costs turn out to have a number of interesting
monotonicity properties, which we use to give a high-dimensional binary search algorithm.
Our second algorithm has running time exponential in the number of edges in the network.
If the number of edges is constant, then this gives us a polynomial-time algorithm. Define
players to be of the same type if they have flow on the same set of edges at equilibrium.
The algorithm is based on the following structural result: for parallel edges, computing
equilibrium in a general ASRG can be reduced to computing equilibrium in an ASRG where
players of the same type also have the same demand. At a high level, this allows us to replace
players of the same type by a single player, and then use our previous algorithm. Somewhat
1 We use the standard notion of polynomial-time computation when outputs are possibly irrational: we
say an algorithm is efficient if for any  > 0, the algorithm computes and -approximate solution in time
polynomial in the inputs size and log(1/).
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surprisingly, this result does not subsume the previous result. This is because the actual
partition of players into types is unknown, hence we must enumerate over all possible such
partitions, which introduces a factor of O(n|E|) to the running time.
Lastly, we show that in general networks, determining existence of a Nash equilibrium
where the cost of every player is at most C is NP-hard. Our proof here is a reduction
from SUBSET-SUM, and builds upon a construction showing multiplicity of equilibria in
ASRGs [4]. Our result parallels early results for bimatrix games [13], which showed that it is
NP-hard to determine existence of a Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games where the cost of
players is above a threshold [13]. Our proof is computer-assisted, and we use Mathematica
to verify properties of equilibria in the games used in our reduction.
Related Work. Existence of equilibria in atomic splittable routing games (and for
more general concave games) is shown by Rosen [25]. Equilibria in these games is unique
when delay functions of the edges are polynomials of degree ≤ 3 [2], when the players are
symmetric, or when the underlying network is nearly-parallel [4]. In general, the equilibria
may not be unique [4]. For computation, the equilibria can be obtained as the solution to
a convex problem if the edge costs are linear, or if the players are symmetric [7]. Huang
considers ASRGs with linear delays on a class of networks called well-designed which includes
series-parallel graphs, and gives a combinatorial algorithm to find the equilibrium [20]. A
network is well-designed if for the optimal flow (which minimizes total cost), increasing the
total flow value does not decrease the flow on any edge. Recently, Harks and Timmermans
give an algorithm to compute equilibrium for ASRGs with player specific-linear costs on
parallel links [17]. This setting allows players to have different cost functions on an edge.
Their results use a reduction to integrally splittable flows, where the flow each player puts
on an edge is an integral multiple of some quantity. In our case, the equilibrium flow can be
irrational, hence these ideas do not seem to work. A number of algorithms for equilibrium
computation are also proposed by Marcotte, who shows convergence results for these [22].
Nonatomic games have an infinite set of players, each of which has infinitesimal flow.
Unlike ASRGs, equilibria in nonatomic games are well-studied: an equilibrium can be
obtained by solving a convex program, and is unique if the costs are strictly nondecreasing [3].
It is also known that ASRGs captures the setting where nonatomic players to form coalitions,
and within a coalition players cooperate to minimize the total cost of its flow [19]. A number
of papers study the change in total cost as players in a nonatomic game form coalitions,
forming an ASRG [19, 5, 20]. Another property of ASRGs that has received a lot of attention
is the price of anarchy (PoA), formalised as the ratio of the total cost of the worst equilibrium,
to the optimal cost. Upper bounds on the PoA were obtained by Cominetti, Correa, and
Stier-Moses [7] and improved upon by Harks [15]. These bounds were shown to be tight [27].
Atomic games where demands are unsplittable are also extensively studied. If all players
have the same demand, these are called congestion games. Player strategies may not
correspond to paths in a graph; if they do, these are called network congestion games. For
congestion games, existence of a potential function is well-known [26], though computing an
equilibrium is PLS-hard [11, 1], even if players are symmetric or the edge cost functions are
linear. For symmetric players in a network congestion game, or if player strategies correspond
to bases of a matroid, the equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time [1, 10].
2 Preliminaries
An atomic splittable routing game (ASRG) Γ = (G = (V,E), (vi, si, ti)i∈[n], (le)e∈E)) is
defined on a directed network G = (V,E) with n players. Each player i wants to send vi
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units of flow from si to ti, where vi is the demand of player i. Each edge e has a cost function
le(x) which is non-negative, increasing, convex and differentiable. Players are indexed so
that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn, and the total demand V :=
∑
i vi. Vector f i denotes the flow of
player i. By abuse of notation, we say vector f is the flow on the network with n players
such that f ie denotes the amount of flow player i sends along the edge e, and fe :=
∑
i f
i
e is
the total flow on edge e.
Given a flow f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) for n players, player i incurs a cost Cie(f) := f iele(fe)
on the edge e. His total cost is Ci(f) = ∑e∈E Cie(f). Each player’s objective is to minimize
his cost, given the flow of the other players. We say a flow f is at equilibrium2 if no player
can unilaterally change his flow and reduce his total cost. More formally,
I Definition 1. In an ASRG a flow f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) is a Nash Equilibrium flow if for
every player i and every flow g = (f1, f2, . . . , f i−1, gi, f i+1, . . . , fn), where gi is a flow of
value vi, Ci(f) ≤ Ci(g).
The equilibrium flow can be characterized in terms of the marginal costs of each player.
Intuitively, the marginal cost for a player on a path is the increase in cost for the player
when he increases his flow on the path by a small amount.
I Definition 2. Given a flow f , the marginal cost for the player i on path p is given by
Lip(f) =
∑
e∈p
le(fe) + f iel′e(fe)
By applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [14] for player i’s minimization problem,
we get the following lemma which characterizes the equilibrium using marginal costs.
I Lemma 3. Flow f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) is a Nash equilibrium flow iff for any player i and
any two directed paths p and q between s and t such that f ie > 0 ∀e ∈ p, Lip(f) ≤ Liq(f).
Lemma 3 says that for any player i at equilibrium, the marginal delay Lip(f) on all paths
p such that f ie > 0 ∀e ∈ p is equal, and is the minimum over all s-t paths. In a network of
parallel edges, every edge is an s-t path, hence the condition holds at equilibrium with edges
replacing paths.
We will frequently use the support of a player, where given a flow f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn),
the support of player i, Si is defined as the set edges with f ie > 0.
Swamy studies the use of edge tolls to enforce a particular flow as equilibrium [30].
However, if we start with an equilibrium flow, the tolls required are identically zero. The
following theorem regarding equilibrium computation is then implicit, and will be useful to
us in Section 4.
I Theorem 4 ([30]). For ASRG Γ , let (he)e∈E be the total flow on each edge at an equilibrium.
Then given the total flow h, the equilibrium flow for each player can be obtained in polynomial
time by solving a convex quadratic program.
We make the following smoothness assumptions on edge cost functions.
1. Cost functions are continuously differentiable, nonnegative, convex, and increasing.
2. There is a constant Ψ ≥ V that satisfies:
Ψ ≥ max
e∈E, x∈[0,V ]
{
le(x), l′e(x), l′′e (x),
1
l′e(x)
}
2 More specifically, a pure Nash equilibrium.
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By the first assumption, the edge marginal cost Lie(f) is strictly increasing, both with the
total flow fe and player i’s flow f ie. Define Li(f) := mine∈E Lie(f). Hence if ~f , ~f ′ are two
equilibrium flows, and for some player i and edge e fe ≥ f ′e, f ie ≥ f ′ei, and f ie > 0, then
Li(f) = Lie(f) ≥ Lie(f ′) ≥ Li(f ′)
and the second inequality is strict if fe > f ′e or f ie > f ie
′. We frequently use this inequality in
our proofs.
Also observe that for each edge e and flow values x, y ∈ [0, V ], the following properties of
the edge cost functions hold.
|x− y| ≤ δ ⇒ |le(x)− le(y)| ≤ δΨ and |le(x)− le(y)| ≤ δ ⇒ |x− y| ≤ δΨ
3 An Algorithm with Complexity Exponential in the Number of
Players
To convey the main ideas of the algorithm, we will ignore issues regarding finite precision
computation in this section. In particular, we assume the algorithm carries out binary
search to infinite precision, and show that such an algorithm computes the exact equilibrium.
In Section A.1, we then give an implementation of the algorithm. We show that our
implementation computes an -equilibrium in time O
(
mn2 (log(nΨ/))n
)
(Theorem 21).
Recall that the equilibrium in case of parallel edges is unique [24]. We start with an
outline of the algorithm. Our first idea is to reduce the problem of equilibrium computation,
to finding the marginal costs at equilibrium. We give a function GraphFlow that at a high
level, given a vector of marginal costs ~M = (M1, . . .Mn), returns a vector of demands
~w = (w1, . . . , wn) and a flow vector ~f = (f ie)e∈E,i∈[n] so that (1) ~f is the equilibrium flow
for the demand vector ~w, and (2) for each player i, the marginal cost Li(f) = M i. That is,
the marginal costs for the players at equilibrium are given by the input vector ~M . We show
that in fact each marginal cost vector ~M maps to a unique (demand, flow) pair that satisfies
these conditions. Hence given marginal costs at equilibrium, the function must return the
correct demands (vi)i∈[n], and the required equilibrium flow. Thus, our problem reduces to
finding a marginal cost vector ~M for which GraphFlow returns the correct demand vector
~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn). We say a demand wi for player i is correct if wi = vi.
Since only the marginal costs and demands matter to us, we can think of GraphFlow as
a function from marginal cost vectors to demand vectors. We then give a high-dimensional
binary search algorithm that computes the required marginal cost vector. This proceeds in a
number of steps. We first show that the function GraphFlow is continuous, and is monotone
in a strict sense: if we increase the marginal cost of a player, then the demand for this
player increases, and the demand for every other player decreases. This allows us to show in
Lemma 7 that given any marginal costs for the first n− k players, there exist marginal costs
for the remaining k players so that the demands returned by GraphFlow for these remaining
players is correct. This lemma allows us to ignore first n− k players, and focus on the last k
players, since no matter what marginal costs we choose for the first n− k players, we can
find marginal costs for the last k players that give the correct demand for these players.
The crux of our binary search algorithm is then Lemma 8, which says the following.
Suppose we are given two marginal cost vectors ~M and ~M ′ that differ only in their last k
coordinates, and for which the demands of the last k − 1 players is equal. Thus, M i = M i′
for all players i < k, and the demands returned by GraphFlow( ~M), GraphFlow( ~M ′) are
equal for all players i > k. Suppose for the kth player, the demand with marginal costs ~M is
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higher than the demand with marginal costs ~M ′. Then the lemma says that k’s marginal cost
in ~M must be higher than in ~M ′, i.e., Mk > Mk′. This lemma allows us to give a recursive
binary search procedure. For a player k, the procedure fixes a marginal cost Mk, and finds
marginal costs for players i > k so that these players have the correct demand. By Lemma 7,
we know that such marginal costs exist. With these marginal costs, if the demand for player
k is greater than vk, then by Lemma 8 Mk is too large. We then reduce Mk, and continue.
Algorithm 1 GraphFlow( ~M)
Input: Vector ~M = (M i)i∈[n] of nonnegative real values
Output: Flow ~f = (fi(e))i∈[n],e∈E and demands ~w = (wi)i∈[n] so that wi = |f i| and ~f is an
equilibrium flow for demands ~w with marginal costs ~M .
1: Assume that M1 ≥M2 ≥ · · · ≥Mn, else renumber the vector components so that this
holds.
2: for each edge e ∈ E do
3: f ie = 0 for each player i ∈ [n]
4: if le(0) ≥M1 then
5: Se ← ∅; continue with the next edge
6: for k = 1→ n do
7: S = [k]
8: Let xe be the unique solution to kle(x) + xl′e(x) =
∑
i∈SM
i . Since le(x) is
strictly increasing and convex, the solution is unique
9: f ie =
Mi−le(xe)
l′e(xe)
for each player i ∈ S . Note that ∑i∈S f ie = xe
10: if (f ie ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S) and (k = n or Mk+1 ≤ le(xe)) then
11: fe ← xe, Se ← S, continue with the next edge
12: wi ←
∑
e f
i
e for each player i; return (~f, ~w)
Algorithm 1 describes the function GraphFlow. The algorithm considers each edge in
turn. For an edge e, it tries to find a subset of players S ⊆ [n] and flows f ie so that, for all
players i ∈ S, Lie(f) = M i, and for all players not in S, f ie = 0 and M i ≤ Lie(f). The set S
can be obtained in O(n) time by adding players to S in decreasing order of marginal costs
M i. Given a set S, summing the equalities Lie(f) = M i, we get the following equation with
variable fe:
|S| le(fe) + fel′e(fe) =
∑
i∈S
M i .
Noting that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in fe, we can solve this equation for fe
using binary search. This gives us the total flow on the edge fe. We can then obtain the flow
for each player by solving, for each player i ∈ S, the following equation:
f ie =
M i − le(fe)
l′e(fe)
.
We set f ie = 0 for all players not in S. It can be checked that
∑
i∈S f
i
e = fe. If f ie ≥ 0 for all
players, and Lie(f) = le(fe) ≥M i for all players not in S, we move on to the next edge. Else,
we add the next player with lower marginal cost M i to the set S, and recompute fe.
We first establish in Claims 1, 2, and 3 that the algorithm is correct, and gives a continuous
map from marginal cost vectors to demand vectors.
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I Claim 1. Given ~M , assume w.l.o.g. that M1 ≥ M2 ≥ · · · ≥ Mn. Then GraphFlow( ~M)
returns flow ~f and demands ~w so that, on each edge e and for each player i,
1. if f ie = 0 then Lie(f) ≥M i
2. if f ie > 0 then Lie(f) = M i
Thus, ~f is an equilibrium flow for values ~w, and if wi > 0 then M i = Li(f).
Proof. Fix an edge e. We first show that for this edge, Se is defined, i.e., either Line 5
or Line 11 is executed. If Line 5 is not executed, then M1 > le(0). More generally, for
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let xe(k) be the value obtained for x in Line 8. For each player i ≤ k, define
f ie(k) = (M i − le(xe(k))/l′e(xe(k))
and f ie(k) = 0 for i > k. Recall that by assumption, M1 ≥M2 ≥ · · · ≥Mn. We will show
that for some value of k, Line 11 gets executed. That is, each f ie(k) ≥ 0, and either k = n or
Mk+1 ≤ le(xe(k)).
Let k = 1. Since M1 > le(0), xe(1) > 0, and hence f1e (1) = xe(1) > 0. More generally,
suppose that for some k ≤ n, f ie(k) ≥ 0 for all players i ≤ k. Then either Line 11 is executed
for this value of k, or Mk+1 > le(xe(k)). We will show that in the latter case, f ie(k + 1) ≥ 0
for i ≤ k + 1. To see this, consider the expressions for xe(k) and xe(k + 1):
M1 + · · ·+Mk = k le(xe(k)) + xe(k) l′e(xe(k))
M1 + · · ·+Mk +Mk+1 = (k + 1) le(xe(k + 1)) + xe(k + 1) l′e(xe(k + 1))
≥ le(xe(k + 1)) + k le(xe(k)) + xe(k) l′e(xe(k))
where the inequality is because xe(k + 1) ≥ xe(k). Subtracting the first expression from
the second then gives us that Mk+1 ≥ le(xe(k + 1)), and hence fk+1e (k + 1) ≥ 0. Since
Mk+1 ≤M i for all i ≤ k + 1, f ie(k + 1) ≥ 0 for all i ≤ k + 1.
Thus, when k = n, either Line 11 has previously been executed, or f ie(n) ≥ 0 for all
player i. In the latter case, the ‘if’ condition holds true, and Line 11 must be executed in
this iteration.
Now fix a player i. We consider the following cases.
Case 1: Se is empty. This is true iff M1 ≤ le(0). In this case, f ie = 0, and M i ≤ M1 ≤
le(0) = Lie(f).
Case 2a: Se is not empty, and i is in Se. Then f ie ≥ 0, and since fe =
∑
i∈[n] f
i
e and by the
expression for f ie in Line 9, we obtain
Lie(f) = le(fe) + f iele(fe) = M i .
Case 2b: Se is not empty, and i is not in Se. Then f ie = 0, M i ≤ le(fe), and le(fe) = Lie(f),
completing the proof. J
I Corollary 5. Given ~M , GraphFlow( ~M) returns flow ~f and demands ~w so that ~f is an
equilibrium flow for values ~w, Li(f) ≤M i, and if wi > 0 then Li(f) = M i.
Proof. Fix a player i. If wi = 0, then f ie = 0 on each edge and this is trivially an
equilibrium flow, and M i ≤ Lie(f) on every edge by the claim. If wi > 0 then on each
edge e with f ie > 0, Lie(f) = M i and M i ≤ Lie′(f) for every edge e′ by the Claim. Hence
Lie(f) = M i = mine′ Lie′(f). Hence player i only puts positive flow on minimum marginal
cost edges, and ~f is an equilibrium. J
I Claim 2. For each vector ~M of marginal costs, there is a unique pair of vectors (~w, ~f) so
that:
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1. ~f is the equilibrium flow for demands ~w, and
2. for each player i, Li(f) ≥M i. If wi > 0, then Li(f) = M i.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that (~w, ~f) and (~w′, ~f ′) satisfy the properties, and the two
are unequal. Since the equilibrium in parallel edges is unique, and ~f , ~f ′ must be equilibrium
flows for ~w, ~w′ respectively, if ~w = ~w′ then ~f = ~f ′. Hence, ~w, ~w′ are unequal. Thus for some
player i, wi 6= w′i. Assume that wi > w′i. Then since wi > 0, Li(f ′) ≥M i = Li(f). Also for
some edge e, f ie > f ie
′. If fe ≥ f ′e, then Lie(f) > Lie(f ′), and hence
M i = Li(f) = Lie(f) > Lie(f ′) ≥ Li(f ′) ≥ M i ,
and thus M i > M i, which is a contradiction. If fe < f ′e, then there is a player j with
f je < f
j
e
′ and w′j > 0. By the same argument as earlier, we again get a contradiction. Thus,
for each vector ~M of marginal costs, there is a unique pair of vectors (~w, ~f) that satisfy the
conditions in the claim. J
I Corollary 6. For a demand vector ~w, let ~f be the equilibrium flow, and M i = Li(f) be
the marginal costs of the players at equilibrium. Then the function GraphFlow(M1, . . . ,Mn)
returns (~w, ~f) as the output.
Proof. The corollary follows by observing that (~w, ~f) satisfy the conditions in Claim 2, and
by the claim is the only pair of vectors that satisfies these conditions; and that by Corollary 5,
GraphFlow(M1, . . . ,Mn) returns a pair of vectors that must satisfy the conditions in Claim 2.
J
I Claim 3. Given marginal costs ~M , ~M ′ so that for player 1, |M1−M1′| ≤ , and M j = M j ′
for all players j > 1, let (~f, ~w) and (~f ′, ~w′) be the flows and demands returned by GraphFlow.
Then for each player i, |f ie − f ie′| ≤ ′, where ′ = 2nΨ. Hence, for each player i, |wi −w′i| ≤
m′.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that for some player k and an edge e, fke ≥ fke ′ + ′. By
Claim 1, flows ~f and ~f ′ are the equilibrium flows for demands ~w and ~w′ respectively. Further,
if for some edge e and player i the flow f ie > 0, then M i = Li(f) = Lie(f). Similarly, if
f ie
′
> 0, then M i′ = Li(f ′) = Lie(f ′).
We will consider two cases. In the first case, assume fe ≥ f ′e. Then since fke > 0,
Mk = Lke(f) = le(fe)+fke l′e(fe) ≥ le(f ′e)+(fke
′+′)le(f ′e) ≥ Lke(f ′)+′/Ψ ≥Mk
′+′/Ψ .
where the second inequality is because le(f ′e) ≥ 1/Ψ, and the last inequality is by Claim 1.
This is a contradiction, since for each player i, |M i −M i′| ≤  = ′/(2nΨ).
Now consider the case that fe < f ′e. Since fke ≥ fke ′ + ′, there exists a player j so that
f je ≤ f je ′ − (′/n). Then proceeding similarly as above, since now f je ′ > 0, we get that
M j
′ ≥ M j + 
′
nΨ .
This is again a contradiction, since |M i −M i′| ≤ ′/(2nΨ) for each player i. J
We note that since in the claim the choice of player 1 is arbitrary, this holds for any player.
The claim then shows that the function GraphFlow is continuous.
In the remainder of the discussion, given a vector of marginal costs ~M , we will primarily
be concerned with the demands ~w returned by the function GraphFlow. We therefore define
the functions GraphVali for each player i ∈ [n]. Function GraphVali takes as input a vector
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~M of marginal costs for the players, and returns the demand wi, the ith component of
the demand vector ~w returned by GraphFlow( ~M). Claim 4 now shows that the function
GraphFlow is monotone: if we increase the input marginal cost of a player, that player’s
demand goes up, while the demand for all the other players goes down. This is crucial in
establishing existence of marginal costs for a subset of players (Lemma 7), and in our binary
search algorithm later on.
I Claim 4. Consider marginal cost vectors ~M and ~M ′ that differ only in their first co-
ordinate, so that ~M = (M i)i∈[n] and ~M ′ = (M1
′
,M2, . . . ,Mn). For each player i, let
wi = GraphVali( ~M), and w′i = GraphVali( ~M ′). If M1
′
> M1, then the following hold true
as well:
1. w′1 ≥ w1,
2. if w′1 > 0, then w′1 > w1,
3. w′i ≤ wi for i > 1, and
4. for any subset of players P containing player 1,
∑
i∈P w
′
i ≥
∑
i∈P wi.
Proof. We first claim that on each edge, the total flow f ′e ≥ fe. This will be used to prove
each of the statements in the claim. Assume for a contradiction that there is an edge e so
that f ′e < fe, and hence a player i with f ie
′
< f ie. Since f ie > 0, by Claim 1, M i = Li(f),
which is also equal to Lie(f). Hence
M i = Li(f) = Lie(f) > Lie(f ′) ≥M i
′
.
But for each player the marginal cost M i′ is at least as large as M i, hence this is a
contradiction.
To prove the third statement in the claim, we show that in fact for each each edge e
and each player i > 1, the flow f ie
′ ≤ f ie. If not, then f ie′ > f ie and f ′e ≥ fe, and a similar
calculation as previously shows that M i′ > M i, which is again a contradiction. Thus for
every player except the first, the flow on every edge is nonincreasing, and hence the demand
w′i ≤ wi for i > 1. Since the total flow on every edge is nondecreasing, player 1’s flow is
nondecreasing on every edge, and hence w′1 ≥ w1, which proves the first statement.
For the second statement in the claim, we have already shown that for each edge, f ′e ≥ fe,
f1e
′ ≥ f1e , and f ie′ ≤ f ie for each player i > 1. Since w′1 > 0, there is an edge e with f1e ′ > 0.
If f1e
′
> f1e on this edge, then clearly w′1 > w1 as required. Suppose for a contradiction that
f1e
′ = f1e > 0. Then since for all other players, f ie
′ ≤ f ie but f ′e ≥ fe, it must be true that
f ′e = fe. Then by Claim 1, M1
′ = Lie(f ′) = Lie(f) = M1, which is a contradiction.
The fourth statement is obtained from two observations. Firstly, the total flow
∑
i w
′
i ≥∑
i wi, since otherwise on some edge f ′e < fe. Second, by the third statement in the claim,
for any set of players P ′ that excludes player 1,
∑
i∈P ′ w
′
i ≤
∑
i∈P ′ wi. Thus, subtracting
the two inequalities, we get
∑
i 6∈P ′ w
′
i ≥
∑
i 6∈P ′ wi, as required. J
Consider the game with cost functions as in Γ , but with n players, each with demand V .
Since this is a symmetric game, the equilibrium flow can be computed in polynomial time [7].
We define Λ to be the marginal cost of each player at this equilibrium.
I Lemma 7. Let S ⊆ [n] be a subset of the players. Given strictly positive input demands
wˆi ≤ V for players i ∈ S and marginal costs M i ≤ Λ for players i 6∈ S, there exist marginal
costs Mˆ i ≤ Λ for the players in S so that, given input ((Mˆ i)i∈S , (M i)i6∈S), GraphVali returns
wˆi as the demand for players i ∈ S.
We first prove two other claims, which establish bounds of [0,Λ] on the marginal cost of
each player, and the second which proves Lemma 7 for the special case when |S| = 1.
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I Claim 5. Consider the marginal cost vector ~M where the first player has marginal costM1 =
Λ, and all other players have marginal costs M i in the interval [0,Λ]. Then GraphVal1( ~M) ≥
V .
Proof. By definition, if each player had marginal cost Λ, then the demand for each player
would be V . Since we do not change the marginal cost of the first player and decrease the
marginal costs for the other players, by Claim 4 the demand for player 1 can only increase.
This completes the proof. J
I Claim 6. Given marginal costs M2, . . . , Mn for all players except the first, each in the
interval [0,Λ] and given a desired demand wˆ ≤ V for the first player, there exists Mˆ ∈ [0,Λ]
so that for the marginal cost vector ~M = (Mˆ,M2, . . .Mn), function GraphVal1 returns
demand wˆ for the first player.
Proof. Consider the marginal cost vectors (0,M2, . . . ,Mn) and (Λ,M2, . . . ,Mn). In the first
case, GraphVal1 returns 0, while in the second case, it returns a value at least V by Claim 5.
Further, by Claim 3, as we vary the marginal cost of player 1, the demands computed by
function GraphVal1 vary continuously. Hence, there must exist some value Mˆ ∈ [0,Λ] for
which GraphVal1 returns wˆ as the demand for player 1. J
Proof of Claim 7. The proof is by constructing a sequence ~M(0), ~M(1), . . . of marginal cost
vectors with each component nondecreasing and bounded from above by Λ. Then by the
monotone convergence theorem, the sequence has a limit ~N . We will show that for all players
i ∈ S, GraphVali( ~N) = wˆi.
The sequence is constructed as follows. We index the steps in the sequence by t. For each
player i 6∈ S, we set M i(t) = M i for each step t. Hence the components corresponding to
players not in S do not change and are bounded by Λ.
Initially, M i(0) = 0 for players i ∈ S. Given ~M(t) with each component at most Λ, we
obtain ~M(t+ 1) as follows. For each player i, we define M i(t+ 1) as the value M so that,
given input (M, (M j(t))j 6=i), the function GraphVal1 returns wˆi as the demand for the first
player. By Claim 6, such a value M exists. Further, M i(t + 1) ≤ Λ by the claim. Hence
each component of ~M(t+ 1) is at most Λ.
We now show that each component in the sequence is nondecreasing. For players not
in S, by construction, the corresponding components in the marginal cost vectors ~M(t)
do not change. Hence we need only concern ourselves with players in S. Further, this is
clearly true for the first step: M i(1) ≥ M i(0) = 0. Suppose this is true for step t, i.e.,
M(t) ≥M(t− 1). Fix a player i ∈ S, and assume for a contradiction that M i(t+ 1) < M i(t).
By construction, given input (M i(t), (M j(t−1))j 6=i), GraphVal1 outputs wˆi > 0. By Claim 4,
sinceM(t) ≥M(t−1), given input (M i(t), (M j(t))j 6=i), GraphVal1 returns a value at most wˆi.
Finally, since wˆi > 0 and M i(t+ 1) < M i(t), given input (M i(t+ 1), (M j(t))j 6=i), GraphVal1
returns a value strictly less than wˆi, which is a contradiction, since by construction that
value returned should be wˆi. Hence, the components of the marginal cost vectors ~M(t) are
monotone, bounded by Λ, and hence the sequence has a limit ~N . Since the component for
each player i not in S is equal to M i throughout the sequence, this is true of ~N as well, and
N i = M i for each player i 6∈ S.
We now show that for each player i ∈ S, GraphVali( ~N) = wˆi. Assume for a contradiction
that GraphVali( ~N) = w′i 6= wˆi, and that |w′i − wˆi| = δ. Let step T be such that, for all
players j and steps t ≥ T , |M j(t)−N j | ≤ δ/(6mn2Ψ). Then, by Claim 3,
|GraphVali( ~M(T + 1))− w′i| ≤ δ/3 ,
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and hence,
|GraphVali( ~M(T + 1))− wˆi| ≥ 2δ/3 . (1)
By construction, GraphVal1(M i(T + 1), (M j(T ))j 6=i) = wˆi. Since ‖M(T + 1)−M(T )‖1 ≤
δ/(6mnΨ), it then follows from Claim 3 that
|GraphVal1( ~M(T + 1))− wˆi| ≤ δ/3 ,
which contradicts (1). Hence, for each player i ∈ S, GraphVali( ~N) = wˆi. J
I Lemma 8. Given a player k, and two marginal cost vectors ~M and ~M ′ that satisfy the
following properties:
1. for all players i < k, M i = M i′,
2. for all players i > k, GraphVali( ~M) = GraphVali( ~M ′).
Let wk = GraphValk( ~M), and w′k = GraphValk( ~M ′). If wk > w′k, then Mk > Mk
′.
Proof. Let Mk ≤ Mk′, and let P be the set of players {i ≥ k : M i ≤ M i′}. Thus k ∈ P .
We will show that wk ≤ w′k. The proof proceeds by changing the marginal cost of each player
in order from M i to M i′, and considering the effect on total demand of players in P . We
show that in this process, the total demand of these players does not increase, and hence∑
i∈P
GraphVali( ~M) ≤
∑
i∈P
GraphVali( ~M ′) . (2)
The expression on the left equals wk +
∑
i∈P,i6=k wi, while the expression on the right equals
w′k +
∑
i∈P,i6=k wi since for players i > k, GraphVali( ~M) = GraphVali( ~M ′). Hence, this will
show that wk ≤ w′k, as required.
We now need to prove (2). Our proof uses Claim 4. Formally, let ~M(t) = ((M i′)i≤t, (M i)i>t).
Then ~M(0) = ~M , and ~M(n) = ~M ′. We will show that∑
i∈P
GraphVali( ~M(t)) ≤
∑
i∈P
GraphVali( ~M(t+ 1)) . (3)
For each player t ∈ [n], there are three cases: either (1) M t = M t′, (2) M t ≤M t′ and t ∈ P ,
or (3) M t > M t′ and t 6∈ P . We consider these three cases separately. In the first case,
~M(t) = ~M(t+ 1), and (3) clearly holds. In the second case, by Claim 4 and since t ∈ P , (3)
holds. In the third case, again by Claim 4, for all i 6= t the demand either increases or
remains the same. Since t 6∈ P , the total demand of players in P either increases or remains
the same, and hence (3) holds. This completes the proof. J
We now give our algorithm for obtaining the “correct” marginal costs ~M , so that
GraphFlow( ~M) returns the required equilibrium flow. The algorithm is recursive.
For each player k, it picks a candidate marginal cost Mk, and then recursively calls itself
to find marginal costs M i for players i > k so that the demands for these players i > k is
correct. If the demand for player k itself is too large, it reduces Mk, and otherwise increases
Mk. Thus the algorithm conducts a binary search to find the correct marginal cost for player
k, and in each iteration calls itself to determine correct marginal values for players i > k.
I Theorem 9. For ASRG Γ , EqMCost1 returns marginal cost vector ~M so that GraphFlow( ~M)
= (~w, ~f), where ~w = ~v and ~f is the equilibrium flow in Γ .
The main ingredient in the proof of the theorem is the following lemma, which shows
that recursively, for any player k, the function EqMCost returns correct marginal costs.
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Algorithm 2 EqMCostk((M1, . . . ,Mk−1))
Input: Vector (M1, . . . ,Mk−1), with each component M i ∈ [0,Λ] . If i = 1, there is no
input required.
Output: Vector ( ~M) of marginal costs so that the first k − 1 marginal costs are equal to
the inputs, and for players i ≥ k, the demand GraphVali( ~M) = vi.
1: if k = n then
2: Using binary search in [0,Λ], find M so that GraphValn((M i)i<n,M) = vn. return
M .
3: Low← 0, High← Λ, Mid← (Low + High)/2
4: (Mk+1, . . . ,Mn)← EqMCostk+1(M1, . . . ,Mk−1,Mid) . Call EqMCostk+1 to get
marginal costs for the remaining player k+ 1, . . . , n so that the demand for these players
is correct
5: if (GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) = vk) then
6: return (Mid, (M i)i>k)
7: else if (GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) > vk) then
8: High← Mid, Mid← (Low + High)/2, goto 4
9: else if (GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) < vk) then
10: Low← Mid, Mid← (Low + High)/2, goto 4
I Lemma 10. For any vector (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) with each component in [0,Λ], the function
EqMCostk((M1, . . . ,Mk−1)) returns marginal costs (Mk, . . . ,Mn) for the remaining players
so that, for each player i ≥ k, GraphVali(M1, . . . ,Mn) = vi.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. In the base case, k = n, and the input is the
vector (M1, . . . ,Mn−1) with each component in [0,Λ]. By Lemma 7, there exists Mˆ so
that GraphValn(M1, . . . ,Mn−1, Mˆ) = vn. We now show that the value Mˆ can correctly
be found by binary search. Initially, the search interval is [0,Λ], and by Claim 7, Mˆ lies
in the search interval. Assume in some iteration the search interval is [Low,High]; Mˆ
lies in the search interval; and that GraphValn(M1, . . . ,Mn−1,Mid) > vn. Since vn > 0,
and vn = GraphValn(M1, . . . ,Mn−1, Mˆ) < GraphValn(M1, . . . ,Mn−1,Mid) it follows by
Lemma 8 that Mˆ < Mid. Hence, Mˆ lies in the interval [Low,Mid], and we can restrict
our search to this space, which is exactly how the binary search proceeds. The case when
GraphValn(M1, . . . ,Mn−1,Mid) < vn is similar, and Mˆ then lies in the interval [Mid,High].
For the inductive step, we are given player k < n. We assume that given any input
vector (M1, . . . ,Mk) with each component in [0,Λ], EqMCostk+1 returns marginal costs
(Mk+1, . . . ,Mn) for the remaining players so that for each of these remaining players
i ≥ k + 1, GraphVali(M1, . . . ,Mn) = vi. We need to show that given any input marginal
costs (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) for the first k−1 players, EqMCostk finds marginal costs (Mk, . . . ,Mn)
for players k onwards so that the demand returned for these players i ≥ k by GraphVali is
vi. Firstly, by Lemma 7, choosing S = [k, . . . , n] and wˆi = vi for players i ∈ S, there exist
marginal costs (Mˆk, . . . , Mˆn) so that for all i ≥ k, GraphVali((M i)i<k, (Mˆ i)i≥k) = vi. We
now show that the binary search procedure in EqMCostk finds the required marginal cost Mˆk.
By the lemma, Mˆk lies in the initial search interval [0,Λ]. Assume that in some iteration,
Mˆk lies in the search interval [Low,High], and Mid = (Low + High)/2. By the induction
hypothesis, EqMCostk+1(M1, . . . ,Mk−1,Mid) returns marginal costs (Mk+1, . . . ,Mn) for
the players k + 1, . . . , n so that for each of these players i ≥ k + 1 (but not player k),
GraphVali((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) = vi. Further, for each player i ≥ k, GraphVali((M i)i<k,
(Mˆ i)i≥k) = vi. Suppose that for player k, GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) > vk =
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GraphVali((M i)i<k, (Mˆ i)i≥k). Then by Lemma 8, Mid > Mˆk, and hence Mˆk lies in the
interval [Mid,High]. The algorithm then reduces the search space to this interval, and
continues. If GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) < vk, it can be similarly shown that Mid <
Mˆk. Thus, Mˆk always lies in the search space [Low,High], which is halved in each iteration.
The binary search is thus correct, and must eventually terminate. J
Proof of Theorem 9. By the lemma, EqMCost1 returns a marginal cost vector ~M =
(M1, . . . , Mn) so that GraphVali( ~M) = vi for each player i. Let ~v = (v1, . . . , vn). By
definition of the function GraphVal, this implies that GraphFlow( ~M) returns vectors ~v and
~f . Finally by Claims 1 and 2, ~f is the equilibrium flow for demands ~v, as required. J
Implementation and Complexity. Under the assumption that binary search could be done
to arbitrary precision, we showed that the algorithm EqMCost is correct. However, the
solutions to the polynomial equations could be irrationals, and thus the algorithm given
is not a finite algorithm. We show in Appendix A.1 that for any given error parameter
, we can implement EqMCost to run in time O
(
poly(log Ψ, log 1 ,m, n)
)
, and return an
-equilibria. We say a flow ~f is an -equilibrium if any player i has flow only on -minimum
marginal cost edges. That is, if f ie > 0 for player i on edge e, then Lie(f) ≤ mine′ Lie′(f) + .
Conventionally, a strategy profile is an -equilibrium if no player can improve it’s cost by .
One can check that the two are equivalent: if a flow f is an -equilibrium by our definition,
then no player i can improve its cost by more than vi, where vi is its demand.
The work in giving an implementation for the algorithm EqMCost is in implementing the
binary search correctly, up to some error parameter . Since the algorithm is iterative, this
error grows across each iteration, and bounding the error in each iteration is quite technical.
Additionally, approximate versions of some of the results for EqMCost have to be reproved.
For example, Lemma 18 and Corollary 18 replace Lemma 8. The basic framework of our
implementation and analysis is similar to our earlier analysis, but differs in many details.
We give further details in Appendix A.1.
4 An Algorithm with Complexity Exponential in Number of Edges
Our second algorithm is based on the following theorem, which shows that at equilibrium
the supports of players form chains.
I Theorem 11 ([4]). Consider an ASRG with n players on a graph consisting of parallel
edges3, and let f be the equilibrium flow. Then L1(f) ≥ · · · ≥ Ln(f). Consequently, the
supports S1(f) ⊇ · · · ⊇ Sn(f).
Thus in an ASRG on m parallel links, there exist numbers 1 = a1 < a2 < · · · < aT ≤ n
with T ≤ m, so that players with indices in [ai, ai+1−1] have the same support at equilibrium.
Define a type set T = (P1, . . . , PT ) with T ≤ m to be a partition of the players so that players
in a set Pt in the partition have consecutive indices. Hence, a type set T = (P1, . . . , PT )
can be denoted by a sequence of numbers (a1, . . . , aT ) where 1 = a1 < a2 < · · · < aT ≤ n
and Pt consists of the players with indices at, . . . , at+1 − 1. We say a type set is valid for
Γ iff two players in the same partition in T also have the same support in the equilibrium.
Theorem 11 then shows that in a graph consisting of m parallel links, there is a type set
that is valid.
3 The proof by Bhaskar et al. [4] is for series-parallel graphs which are a superset of parallel link graphs.
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We will now give an algorithm with running time that is exponential in the number of
edges, using the algorithm from Section 3, which is exponential in the number of players, and
Theorem 4. Our algorithm in this section crucially uses Lemma 12, which has the following
content. Let T = (P1, . . . , PT ) be a type set, not necessarily valid, for a game Γ . Consider
the game Γ T where for each set Pt ∈ T , we replace the players in Pt with |Pt| players that
have the same demand, given by
∑
i∈Pt vi/|Pt|. That is, we pick a set Pt, and replace all
players in this set by players with demands equal to the average demand of players in Pt.
We do this for each set Pt. Lemma 12 then says that if T is valid for Γ , then the total flow
on any edge does not change between Γ and Γ T .
I Lemma 12. Let T = (P1, . . . , PT ) be the valid type set for game Γ with n players on a
network of parallel edges. Let f and g be the respective equilibrium flows for games Γ and
Γ T respectively. Then on each edge e, fe = ge.
The proof of Lemma 12 closely follows an earlier proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in
an ASRG [4, Theorem 5]. The lemma implies that in an ASRG on parallel edges we can
replace players that have the same support with players that have the same demand without
affecting the total flow at equilibrium on the edges. Further, given the total flow on each edge
at equilibrium in a general network, the flow for each player can be computed by Theorem 4.
Proof of Lemma 12. The proof is by contradiction. Let E+ be the set of edges with fe > ge,
and E− be the remaining edges. Let P+ := {t : ∃e ∈ E+ ∑i∈Pt f ie >∑i∈Pt gie} be the set of
types that, on any edge in E+, have more flow in f than in g. Let type t ∈ P+, and e ∈ E+
be an edge so that
∑
i∈Pt f
i
e >
∑
i∈Pt g
i
e}. Since all players in Pt have the same support, this
implies that f ie > 0 for all players i ∈ Pt. Further, this implies that
∑
i∈Pt
Li(f) =
∑
i∈Pt
Lie(f) >
∑
i∈Pt
Lie(g) ≥
∑
i∈Pt
Li(g) . (4)
Let P− be the remaining player types, and note that for any type t ∈ P−, ∑i∈Pt f ie ≤∑
i∈Pt g
i
e}. Now consider the total difference in flow on edges in E+:
0 <
∑
e∈E+
fe − ge =
∑
e∈E+
∑
t∈P+
∑
i∈Pt
(
f ie − gie
)
+
∑
e∈E+
∑
t∈P−
∑
i∈Pt
(
f ie − gie
)
.
The first inequality is by definition of E+. Now note that the last summand is non positive,
hence∑
e∈E+
∑
t∈P+
∑
i∈Pt
(
f ie − gie
)
> 0
Hence there is a player type t ∈ P+ for which the total flow on edges in E+ is strictly
greater in f than in g. Since the total flow across all edges for player type t must remain
conserved, there is an edge in E− with
∑
i∈Pt f
i
e <
∑
i∈Pt g
i
e. But this gives us that∑
i∈Pt L
i(f) <
∑
i∈Pt L
i(g), contradiction (4). J
Our algorithm for computing equilibrium in a game Γ is now as follows. We first
enumerate over all type sets with at most m types. For each type set T = (P1, . . . , PT ), we
consider the game Γ T , and modify the algorithm EqMCost from the previous section to
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return the equilibrium fT for Γ T , with running time exponential in T ≤ m. We then use
Theorem 4 to check if the total flow on each edge in flow fT can be decomposed into an
equilibrium flow for Γ . By Theorem 11, there is a valid type set T , and then by Lemma 12
for the valid type set T , the flow on each edge in fT is equal to the flow on each edge at
equilibrium in Γ . Theorem 4 then gives us a decomposition into flows from each player.
In Algorithm EqMCostTy, for simplicity, we use the notation M i×|Pi| to denote the vector
where M i is repeated |Pi| times. Further, (M i×|Pi|)i>t is used to denote the vectorM t+1, . . . ,M t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Pt+1| times
, . . . ,MT , . . . ,MT︸ ︷︷ ︸
|PT | times
 .
Algorithm 3 EqMCostTyt(T = (P1, . . . , PT ), (M1, . . . ,M t−1))
Input: Vector (M1, . . . ,M t−1), with each component M j ∈ [0,Λ]. Type set T =
(P1, . . . , PT ) . If t = 1, only the type set is required as input.
Output: Vector (−→M) of marginal costs so that the first ak−1 marginal costs are equal to
the inputs, and for players i ≥ ak−1 + 1, the demand GraphVali( ~M) = vi.
1: if t = T then
2: Using binary search in [0,Λ], findM so that GraphValn((M i×|Pi|)i<T ,M,M, . . . ,M︸ ︷︷ ︸
|PT | times
) =
vn.
3: return M
4: Low← 0, High← Λ, Mid← (Low + High)/2.
5: (M t+1, . . . ,Mn)← EqMCostt+1(T , (M1, . . . ,M t−1,Mid,Mid, . . . ,Mid︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Pt| times
) . Call
EqMCostTyt+1 to get marginal costs for the remaining player types t+ 1, . . . , T so that
the demand for these player types is correct.
6: if (GraphValat((M i×|Pi|)i<t,Mid,Mid, . . . ,Mid︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Pt| times
, ((M i×|Pi|)i>t) = vat) then
7: return (Mid, (M i)i>t)
8: else if (GraphValat((M i×|Pi|)i<t,Mid,Mid, . . . ,Mid︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Pt| times
, (M i×|Pi|)i>t) > vat) then
9: High← Mid, Mid← (Low + High)/2, goto 5
10: else if (GraphValat((M i×|Pi|)i<t,Mid,Mid, . . . ,Mid︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Pt| times
, (M i×|Pi|)i>t) < vat) then
11: Low← Mid, Mid← (Low + High)/2, goto 5
I Claim 7. Consider ASRG on parallel edge graph with m edges and n players. Then number
of possible typesets at equilibrium is(
n+m− 1
m− 1
)
.
Proof. Since supports of players at equilibrium form chains (Theorem 11), we have S1 ⊇
S2 ⊇ . . . ⊇ Sn. Consider an equilibrium flow f and let (P1, P2, . . . , Pm) is the typeset, where
each Pi ⊆ [n]. By Theorem 11, we can rename P1, P2, . . . , Pm such that for every pair of
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players a and b, if a ∈ Pi and b ∈ Pj such that i < j then va ≥ vb. Therefore, it is easy to
see that number of ways of choosing the typeset (P1, P2, . . . , Pm) is same as the number of
ways one can fill m bins with n identical balls(some bins can be empty). By simple counting
we get this number to be
(
n+m−1
m−1
)
. J
Here, we briefly describe the modification to EqMCost so that it runs in time exponential
in the number of edges, rather than the number of players n.
The algorithm EqMCost runs a binary search for the marginal cost at equilibrium for
each player. For each player i, EqMCosti runs a binary search, in each iteration of which
it calls EqMCosti+1. If each binary search runs for R iterations, and each iteration takes
time S, then this recursively gives a running time of O(S Rn). However, if players i, i+ 1
have the same demand, then by Theorem 11 they also have the same marginal cost at
equilibrium. Hence we can run the binary search for the marginal cost at equilibrium, for
both players simultaneously. This is the basic idea for the modification. For a given type set
T = (P1, . . . , PT ), and the game Γ T , we know that all players in the same set Pt have the
same marginal cost at equilibrium. Hence, we run the binary search once for each set Pt,
rather than once for each player. By Theorem 11, the number of types T ≤ m.
This gives us the reduced running time of O(S Rm) for type set T , for each run of the
modified algorithm EqMCostTy. However, note that we run the algorithm once for each
possible type set. If the game is played on m parallel links, then Claim 7 shows that the
number of possible type sets is about (n+m)m. From Theorem 21, this gives us a running
time of O
(
(n+m)mm3 (log(nΨ/))m
)
.
5 Hardness of Computing Equilibria
Prior to the proof of PPAD-hardness of computing a (mixed) Nash equilibrium in bimatrix
games, Gilboa and Zemel showed that it was NP-hard to determine if there existed an
equilibrium in bimatrix games where the every player had payoff above a given threshold
C [13]. We show a similar result for ASRGs.
I Theorem 13. Given an ASRG with convex, strictly increasing and continuously differenti-
able cost functions, it is NP-hard to determine if there exists an equilibrium at which cost of
every player is at most C.
The main idea of the proof is to build upon the existence of multiple equilibria in
ASRGs, and is a reduction from SUBSET-SUM. In SUBSET-SUM, we are given a set
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} ⊂ N such that the sum of elements in S is M , and we want to determine
if there exists a subset T ⊆ S such that the sum of elements in T is M/2. This problem
is known to be NP-complete. Our reduction is in two steps. First, we construct an ASRG
G with four players b, r, p, and q, and exactly three equilibria, one of which is irrational,
which is used as gadget in the reduction (Figure 1).4 This construction builds upon an
earlier example showing multiplicity of equilibria in ASRGs [4]. We will be mainly concerned
with the rational equilibrium flows, say f and g. We choose the cost functions so that (i)
Cpe7(g) > Cpe7(f), and (ii) the sum of costs of players p and q are equal for f and g, that is,
Λ := Cpe7(f) + Cqe9(f) = Cpe7(g) + Cqe9(g) (5)
4 We use Mathematica to verify properties of equilibria in the games used in the reduction. This is
explained in the appendix, and the files used are available on the second author’s home page.
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Then Cqe9(f) > Cqe9(g).
We now repeat this subgame n times in series, once for each element in the set S in the
SUBSET-SUM instance (see Figure 3). Each subgame is independent of the others, i.e., the
players bi and ri in ith subgame are local to that subgame and do not play any role in other
subgames. All the subgames are connected by players p and q, who can only use one edge
(e7 and e9 respectively) in each subgame. We show that f , g, and h continue to be the only
equilibria within each subgame. In the ith subgame Gi, we multiply each cost function by
si. This causes all costs to get multiplied by si, and does not affect the equilibria. Thus, in
each subgame Gi, player p has costs siCpe7(f) and siCpe9(g) in equilibrium flows f , g, and h
(confined to the subgame) respectively. Similar for player q. Roughly, we think of equilibrium
f in a subgame as putting si in the subset S, and equilibrium g as leaving si out.
We will show that if the given instance satisfies SUBSET-SUM, then there exists an
equilibrium at which both players p and q have cost (MΛ)/2, otherwise at least one of them
has cost strictly greater than (MΛ)/2. At equilibrium in the game, let F be the subgames
where f is the equilibrium, and G be the subgames where g is the equilibrium. Then the
total cost of players p and q is
Cpe7(f)
∑
i∈F
si + Cpe7(g)
∑
i∈G
si + Cqe9(f)
∑
i∈F
si + Cqe9(g)
∑
i∈G
si = MΛ
where the equality follows from (5). From Cpe7(g) > Cpe7(f), it follows that the cost of each
player p, q is (MΛ)/2 iff at equilibrium,
∑
i∈F si =
∑
i∈G si. Else, since the sum of costs of
the two players is constant, exactly one player has cost above (MΛ)/2.
To complete the proof, we add player-specific edges to ensure that (MΛ)/2 is large enough
so that all the other players bi, ri always have cost at most (MΛ)/2 at any equilibrium.
In the appendix, we give the detailed reduction, as well as proofs of the properties of
equilibria that we use. The exact calculations are done using Mathematica, the files for
which are available at the second author’s homepage. Here we give a high-level description
of the reduction and the main points of the proof.
5.1 Gadget G
As mentioned earlier, game G has 4 players b, r, p, and q with network shown in Figure 1.
Players b and r want to send vb = 4763.5 and vr = 2415.3 units of flow from s to t. Players p
and q want to send vp = 100 and vq = 100 units of flow from sp to tp and sq to tq respectively.
We will show in the Appendix (Lemma 24) that G has 3 equilibria f, g and h where f and
g are rational equilibria i.e., have rational flows on edges and h is an irrational equilibrium.
The approximate equilibrium flow values are given in Table 1.
Proof of Theorem 13. Let Cp(f), Cp(g) and Cp(h) are the costs of player p at equilibria f ,
g and h respectively in game G. Similarly Cq(f), Cq(g) and Cq(h) are the costs of player q at
equilibria f , g and h respectively.
Consider ASRG game H with 2n+2 players with network as shown in Figure 3. Players p
and q want to send vp = 100 and vq = 100 units of flow from sp to tp and sq to tq respectively.
For each i ∈ [n], players bi and ri want to send vbi = 4763.5 and vri = 2415.3 units of flow
from si to ti.
The cost functions for edges eij is leij (x) = silej (x) ∀j ∈ [10], i ∈ [n]. The cost functions
on edges o, oi is loi(x) = x and for edges r, ri is lri(x) = x ∀i ∈ [n]. Observe the following:
Player p has only one path to send his flow i.e., via o − e17 − o1 − e27 − o2 − . . . − on.
Similarly player q has only one path to send his flow i.e., via r−e19−r1−e29−r2− . . .−rn.
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Figure 1 ASRG G, with multiple equilibria
Table 1 Equilibrium flows for ASRG G accurate up to 2 decimals
Edge f g h
b r b r b r
e1 500 100 540 50 527.41 71.78
e2 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e3 0 100 0 50 0 71.78
e4 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e5 500 100 540 50 527.41 71.78
e6 3763.5 2315.30 3683.5 2365.30 3708.69 2343.54
e7 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e8 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e9 3763.5 2315.30 3683.5 2365.30 3708.69 2343.54
e10 3763.5 2315.30 3683.5 2365.30 3708.69 2343.54
For each i, players bi and ri want to send their flow from si to ti. They can only use
the edges eij , j ∈ [10]. Since the costs of edges eij is leij (x) = silej (x), ∀j ∈ [10], the
equilibrium conditions of bi and ri in Gi (and so in H) are same as the equilibrium
conditions of b and r in G, when multiplied by si on both sides. Therefore, the equilibria
of bi and ri in Gi (and so in H) are the same as the equilibria of b and r in G.
In Claim 8 in the appendix, we show that Cpe7(f) + C
q
e9(f) = C
p
e7(g) + C
q
e9(g) i.e.,
the sum of costs of players p and q in G is some constant A. Since the cost functions
in each gadget Gi are multiples of cost functions in G, the above claim implies that the
sum of costs by players p and q on Gi is the siA if the flow is either f or g in Gi. This
allows us to make the following claim. Let CP = M/2(Cpe7(g) + C
p
e7(f)) + 10
4(n+ 1) and
CQ = M/2(Cqe9(f) + C
q
e9(g)) + 10
4(n+ 1). In the following lemma, we show that CP and
CQ are the costs of players p and q respectively when the equilibrium in game H is such
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Figure 3 Reduction to SUBSET-SUM problem
that if gadget i has flow f , then si ∈ T , and if it has flow g, then si /∈ T.
I Lemma 14. Suppose G has only two rational equilibria, f and g. Then in ASRG H, there
exists an equilibrium such that the players p and q have costs CP and CQ respectively iff
set S satisfies the SUBSET-SUM problem. If S does not satisfy SUBSET-SUM then at every
equilibrium, either player p has cost stricly greater than CP or player q has cost stricly
greater than CQ.
Proof. Let S satisfy SUBSET-SUM and T, T ′ be the satisfying partition. Observe that the
gadget siG corresponds to the element si in the set S. Consider the equilibrium of H where
if si ∈ T , then gadget siG has equilibrium flow f else equilibrium flow g. Therefore, the cost
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of player p at this equilibrium in H is
=
∑
si∈T
siC
p
e7(f) +
∑
si∈T ′
siC
p
e7(g) + 10
4(n+ 1)
= M/2(Cpe7(g)) +M/2(C
p
e7(f)) + 10
4(n+ 1)
= M/2(Cpe7(g) + C
p
e7(f)) + 10
4(n+ 1).
Similarly, one can argue for player q.
Now consider the case where S does not satisfy SUBSET-SUM. Let T, T ′ be a partition
of set S, such the if si ∈ T , then gadget siG, has equilibrium f else has equilibrium g. Now
consider the sum of costs of players p and q at this equilibrium in H, which is
=
∑
si∈T
siC
p
e7(f) +
∑
si∈T ′
siC
p
e7(g) + 10
4(n+ 1)
+
∑
si∈T
siC
q
e9(f) +
∑
si∈T ′
siC
q
e9(g) + 10
4(n+ 1)
=
∑
si∈T
si(Cpe7(f) + C
q
e9(f)) +
∑
si∈T ′
si(Cpe7(g) + C
q
e9(g)) + 2.10
4(n+ 1)
By Claim 8, we can write the above expression as
= M/2(Cpe7(f) + C
q
e9(f)) +M/2(C
p
e7(g) + C
q
e9(g)) + 2.10
4(n+ 1)
=
{
M/2(Cpe7(g) + C
p
e7(f)) + 10
4(n+ 1)
}
+
{
M/2(Cqe9(f) + C
q
e9(g)) + 10
4(n+ 1)
}
= CP + CQ.
Therefore at any equilibrium, sum of costs of players p and q is CP + CQ which is constant.
Suppose partition T, T ′ is such that sum of elements in T is > M/2. Then the cost of player
p at the corresponding equilibrium is
=
∑
si∈T
siC
p
e7(f) +
∑
si∈T ′
siC
p
e7(g) + 10
4(n+ 1)
< M/2(Cpe7(f) + C
p
e7(g)) + 10
4(n+ 1) (Cpe7(f) < C
p
e7(g).)
Since, the sum of costs of players p and q is constant the cost of player q at this equilibrium
flow is > CQ. J
It can be calculated that Cpe7(h) +C
q
e9(h) > C
p
e7(f) +C
q
e9(f) = C
p
e7(g) +C
q
e9(g) (detailed
calculations are done in provided Mathematica file named "Flows.nb"). It is easy to see
that if any gadget has equilibrium flow h, then the sum of the costs of players p and q is
> CP + CQ. Hence, either player p has cost > CP or player q has cost > CQ.
Hence, we have shown that S satisfies SUBSET-SUM, iff at some equilibrium the players
p and q has cost CP and CQ respectively. Define
C1 = max
i∈[n]
 maxequilibrium
flows f,g,h
{cost of player bi, cost of player ri}

and C = max{C1, CP,CQ}. Then extra edges can be added to the paths of players p and q
respectively, such that both p and q have cost C iff S satisfies SUBSET-SUM. Also, at any
possible equilibrium flow of H, for each i ∈ [n], cost of players bi and ri is at most C. This
proves the theorem.
J
U. Bhaskar and P. R. Lolakapuri 23:21
References
1 Heiner Ackermann, Heiko Röglin, and Berthold Vöcking. On the impact of combinatorial
structure on congestion games. In 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science (FOCS 2006), 21-24 October 2006, Berkeley, California, USA, Proceedings,
pages 613–622, 2006.
2 Eitan Altman, Tamer Başar, Tania Jimenez, and Nahum Shimkin. Competitive routing in
networks with polynomial costs. Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on, 47(1):92–96,
2002.
3 MJ Beckmann, CB Mc Guire, and CB Weinstein. Studies in the economics of transporta-
tion, yale university press. New Haven, Connecticut, USA, 1956.
4 Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer, Darrell Hoy, and Chien-Chung Huang. On the uniqueness
of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games. Math. Oper. Res., 40(3):634–654, 2015.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0688, doi:10.1287/moor.2014.0688.
5 Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer, and Chien-Chung Huang. The price of collusion in series-
parallel networks. In Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization, 14th Interna-
tional Conference, IPCO 2010, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 9-11, 2010. Proceedings, pages
313–326, 2010.
6 Kshipra Bhawalkar, Martin Gairing, and Tim Roughgarden. Weighted congestion games:
The price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness. ACM Trans. Economics
and Comput., 2(4):14:1–14:23, 2014.
7 Roberto Cominetti, José R. Correa, and Nicolás E. Stier Moses. The impact of oligopolistic
competition in networks. Operations Research, 57(6):1421–1437, 2009. URL: http://dx.
doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0653, doi:10.1287/opre.1080.0653.
8 David Cox, John Little, and Donal O’shea. Ideals, varieties, and algorithms, volume 3.
Springer, 1992.
9 Constantinos Daskalakis. On the complexity of approximating a nash equilibrium. ACM
Trans. Algorithms, 9(3):23:1–23:35, 2013.
10 Alex Fabrikant, Christos Papadimitriou, and Kunal Talwar. The complexity of pure nash
equilibria. In Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of comput-
ing, pages 604–612. ACM, 2004.
11 Alex Fabrikant, Christos H. Papadimitriou, and Kunal Talwar. The complexity of pure nash
equilibria. In Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
Chicago, IL, USA, June 13-16, 2004, pages 604–612, 2004.
12 Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, and Sadra Yazdanbod. Settling the complexity
of leontief and PLC exchange markets under exact and approximate equilibria. In Proceed-
ings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017,
Montreal, QC, Canada, June 19-23, 2017, pages 890–901, 2017.
13 Itzhak Gilboa and Eitan Zemel. Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity consid-
erations. Games and Economic Behavior, 1(1):80–93, 1989.
14 Geoff Gordon and Ryan Tibshirani. Karush-kuhn-tucker conditions. Optimization,
10(725/36):725, 2012.
15 Tobias Harks. Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow.
Theory of Computing Systems, 48(4):781–802, 2011.
16 Tobias Harks, Ingo Kleinert, Max Klimm, and Rolf H Möhring. Computing network tolls
with support constraints. Networks, 65(3):262–285, 2015.
17 Tobias Harks and Veerle Timmermans. Equilibrium computation in atomic splittable
singleton congestion games. In Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization -
19th International Conference, IPCO 2017, Waterloo, ON, Canada, June 26-28, 2017,
Proceedings, pages 442–454, 2017.
23:22 Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Routing Games with Convex Cost Functions
18 Ara Hayrapetyan, Éva Tardos, and TomWexler. The effect of collusion in congestion games.
In Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Seattle, WA,
USA, May 21-23, 2006, pages 89–98, 2006.
19 Ara Hayrapetyan, Éva Tardos, and TomWexler. The effect of collusion in congestion games.
In Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages
89–98. ACM, 2006.
20 Chien-Chung Huang. Collusion in atomic splittable routing games. Theory Comput.
Syst., 52(4):763–801, 2013. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9421-4, doi:
10.1007/s00224-012-9421-4.
21 Elias Koutsoupias and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. Computer Science
Review, 3(2):65–69, 2009.
22 Patrice Marcotte. Algorithms for the network oligopoly problem. Journal of the Operational
Research Society, pages 1051–1065, 1987.
23 Ariel Orda, Raphael Rom, and Nahum Shimkin. Competitive routing in multiuser commu-
nication networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (ToN), 1(5):510–521, 1993.
24 Oran Richman and Nahum Shimkin. Topological uniqueness of the nash equilibrium for
selfish routing with atomic users. Math. Oper. Res., 32(1):215–232, 2007. URL: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0229, doi:10.1287/moor.1060.0229.
25 J Ben Rosen. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 520–534, 1965.
26 Robert W Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 2(1):65–67, 1973.
27 Tim Roughgarden and Florian Schoppmann. Local smoothness and the price of anarchy
in splittable congestion games. Journal of Economic Theory, 156:317–342, 2015.
28 Bernd Sturmfels. What is... a grobner basis? NOTICES-AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL
SOCIETY, 52(10):1199, 2005.
29 Subhash Suri, Csaba D Tóth, and Yunhong Zhou. Selfish load balancing and atomic
congestion games. Algorithmica, 47(1):79–96, 2007.
30 Chaitanya Swamy. The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network conges-
tion games. ACM Trans. Algorithms, 8(4):36:1–36:19, 2012. URL: http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/2344422.2344426, doi:10.1145/2344422.2344426.
A Appendix
A.1 Implementation
We start with an implementation of the binary search procedure to find an approximate
solution to a polynomial equation.
We note that from Algorithm ̂GraphFlow, the highest value ofM that ̂BinSearch is called
with is nΛ ≤ 2nΨ2.
I Lemma 15. If M ≥ kle(0), the algorithm ̂BinSearch returns value xˆ so that |xˆ− x∗| ≤ δ,
where x∗ solves kle(x) + xl′e(x) = M , in time O
(
log 2nΨ3δ
)
.
Proof. It is easy to see that the algorithm terminates in the stated time, since in each
iteration of the while loop, the algorithm either terminates and returns a value xˆ so that
kle(xˆ)+ xˆl′e(xˆ) ∈ [M±δ/(2Ψ), or halves the difference High−Low. In any case, it terminates
if High− Low ≤ δ, giving us the bound on the time complexity.
To see that xˆ has the required property, note that for any x, if |x− x∗| ≥ δ, then
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Algorithm 4 ̂BinSearch (k, e, M , δ)
Input: Integer k, edge e, function value M ≥ k le(0), precision δ > 0.
Output: Nonnegative flow xˆ so that |xˆ− x∗| ≤ δ, where x∗ solves kle(x) + xl′e(x) = M .
1: Low← 0, High←MΨ
2: while High− Low ≥ δ do
3: Mid← (High− Low)/2
4: if kle(Mid) + Mid l′e(Mid) > M + δ/(2Ψ) then
5: High← Mid
6: else
7: if kle(Mid) + Mid l′e(Mid) < M − δ/(2Ψ) then
8: Low← Mid
9: else
10: return Mid
‖(kle(x) + xl′e(x))− (kle(x∗) + x∗l′e(x∗))‖ ≥ δ/Ψ .
hence in the first case, if kle(xˆ) + xˆl′e(xˆ) ∈ [M ± δ/(2Ψ), then |xˆ− x∗| ≤ δ.
Now suppose the algorithm terminates with High − Low ≤ δ. We will show that x∗ ∈
[Low,High], completing the proof since the algorithm returns Mid = (High−Low)/2. Consider
the first iteration of the while loop. Since kle(0) ≥M , x∗ ≥ 0. Further, kle(MΨ) ≥ kM , and
hence x∗ ≤MΨ. Hence in the first iteration, x∗ ∈ [Low,High]. Now suppose that in some
iteration the statement is true. Clearly, if kle(Mid) + Mid l′e(Mid) > M , then Mid > x∗, and
x∗ must then be in the interval [Low,Mid]. The algorithm sets High to Mid, and hence the
statement is true in the next interval as well. In the other case, if kle(Mid) + Mid l′e(Mid)
< M , then Mid < x∗, and again the statement that x∗ ∈ [Low,High] can be verified to be
true in the following interval as well. Thus, x∗ always lies in the interval [Low,High], as
required. J
The next algorithm is a redistribution procedure for vectors. Given a vector ~M =
(M1, . . . ,Mk) and a scalar Mˆ so that |Mˆ −∑iM i| ≤ , the procedure returns a nonnegative
that is component-wise -close to ~M , and sums to Mˆ .
I Lemma 16. The algorithm ̂Redistrib returns a vector (Mˆ i)i≤k that satisfies |M i − Mˆ i| ≤
|M − Mˆ | for all i ≤ k, and ∑i≤k Mˆ i = Mˆ .
Proof. In the first case, when Mˆ ≥M , the two properties required in the lemma can easily
be verified. In the other case, when M ≥ Mˆ , we note that for i ≥ 1,
δ(i) = R(i)− Rˆ(i) = R(i− 1)−M i − Rˆ(i− 1)− Mˆ i = δ(i− 1)− (M i − Mˆ i) . (6)
We first show that the deficits δ(i) are nonincreasing and nonnegative, thus
M − Mˆ = δ(0) ≥ δ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ δ(k) ≥ 0 . (7)
Intuitively, this follows because each M i − Mˆ i absorbs some (if not all) of the deficit.
Concretely, by induction, Mˆ1 = max{0,M1 − δ(0)}. Since δ(0) > 0 and M1 ≥ 0, we get
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Algorithm 5 ̂Redistrib (M , Mˆ , k, (M i)i≤k)
Input: Nonnegative scalars M , Mˆ ≥ 0, nonnegative k-vector (M i)i≤k of nonnegative real
values with
∑
i≤kM
i = M .
Output: Nonnegative k-vector (Mˆ i)i≤k so that |M i − Mˆ i| ≤ |M − Mˆ | for all i ≤ k, and∑
i≤k Mˆ
i = Mˆ .
1: if Mˆ ≥M then . In this case, give all the excess to player 1
2: Mˆ1 = M1 + (Mˆ −M), Mˆ i = M i for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}
3: else . If M > Mˆ , distribute deficit starting from player 1, maintaining nonnegativity
4: R(0)←M , Rˆ(0)← Mˆ , δ(0)← R(0)− Rˆ(0)
5: for i = 1→ k do
6: Mˆ i = max{0,M i − δ(i− 1)}
7: R(i)← R(i− 1)−M i, Rˆ(i) = Rˆ(i− 1)− Mˆ i, δ(i)← R(i)− Rˆ(i)
8: return (Mˆ i)i≤k
that M1 ≥ Mˆ1 ≥M1 − δ(0). Hence from (6), δ(1) ≤ δ(0), and δ(1) ≥ 0. Now suppose that
δ(0) ≥ · · · ≥ δ(i− 1) ≥ 0. Since Mˆ i = max{0,M i − δ(i− 1)}, we again obtain that
M i ≥ Mˆ i ≥M i − δ(i− 1) (8)
and hence, from (6), δ(i) ≤ δ(i − 1), and δ(i) ≥ 0. Note that the first part of the lemma
follows from (8) and the fact just proven that δ(i) ≤ δ(0) = M − Mˆ .
From (6), summing over all players i ≤ k,
∑
i≤k
(M i − Mˆ i) =
∑
i≤k
δ(i− 1)− δ(i) = δ(0)− δ(k) = M − Mˆ − δ(k) .
We now show that δ(k) = 0, and hence
∑
i≤k Mˆ
i = Mˆ . For a contradiction, suppose
that δ(k) = 0. Then from (7), each δ(i) > 0, for i ≤ k. From (6), this implies that
Mˆ i > M i − δ(i − 1). By definition, Mˆ i = max{0,M i − δ(i − 1)}, hence this implies that
Mˆ i = 0 for each i ≤ k. Thus, ∑i≤k Mˆ i = 0. Plugging this into the previous displayed
equation gives us that M = M − Mˆ − δ(k), or δ(k) + Mˆ = 0. Since Mˆ is nonnegative and
δ(k) is strictly positive by assumption, this gives us a contradiction. Thus, δ(k) = 0, and∑
i≤k Mˆ
i = Mˆ , proving the second part of the lemma. J
Algorithm ̂GraphFlow implements GraphFlow.
Note that the time complexity of ̂GraphFlow is O
(
mn2 log(2nΨ3/δ)
)
, since it makes at
most mn calls to ̂BinSearch and ̂Redistrib.
I Lemma 17. Algorithm ̂GraphFlow ( ~M, δ) returns flow vector ~f and demands ~w so that ~f
is an 4nΨ2δ-equilibrium flow for demands ~w, and |wi −GraphVali( ~M)| ≤ 4mnδΨ5.
Proof. We first show that the flow ~f is an -equilibrium for demands ~w. For each edge e,
note that the players in Se are the only players that can have positive flow on the edge. Fix
an edge e. Then xˆe is the approximate solution returned by ̂BinSearch to the polynomial
equation
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Algorithm 6 ̂GraphFlow ( ~M, δ)
Input: Vector ~M = (M i)i∈[n] of nonnegative real values in [0,Λ], precision δ > 0
Output: Flow ~f and demands ~w so that ~f is an 4nΨ2δ-approximate equilibrium flow for
demands ~w, and |wi −GraphVali( ~M)| ≤ 4mδΨ4.
1: Assume that M1 ≥M2 ≥ · · · ≥Mn, else renumber the vector components so that this
holds.
2: for each edge e ∈ E do
3: f ie = 0 for each player i ∈ [n]
4: if le(0) + 2nΨ2δ ≥M1 then
5: Se ← ∅; continue with the next edge
6: for k = 1→ n do
7: S = [k]
8: xˆe ← ̂BinSearch(ke, e,
∑
i∈SM
i, δ)
9: Mˆe ← |S|le(xˆe) + xˆel′e(xˆe)
10: (Mˆ ie)i≤k ← ̂Redistrib
(∑
i∈SM
i, Mˆ , k, (M i)i≤k
)
11: f ie =
Mˆie−le(xˆe)
l′e(xˆe)
for each player i ∈ S . Note that ∑i∈S f ie = xˆe
12: if (k = n or Mk+1 ≤ le(xˆe) + 2nΨ2δ) then
13: fe ← xˆe, Se ← S
14: Continue with the next edge
15: wi ←
∑
e f
i
e for each player i
16: return (~f, ~w)
|Se|le(x) + xl′e(x) =
∑
i∈Se
M i . (9)
Let x∗e be the exact solution to (9). Then by Lemma 15, |x∗e − xˆe| ≤ δ. Further, a simple
calculation then gives us that
|Mˆe −
∑
i∈Se
M i| ≤ nδΨ + Ψ2δ ≤ 2nδΨ2 .
By Lemma 16, this then gives us that for each player i ∈ Se, |Mˆ ie −M i| ≤ |Mˆe −
∑
i∈Se M
i|
≤ 2nδΨ2. For each player i 6∈ Se, f ie = 0, and M i ≤M |Se|+1 ≤ le(xˆe) + 2nΨ2δ.
This is sufficient to show that ~f is an approximate equilibrium, since the minimum
marginal cost on any edge is at least M i − 2nΨ2δ, and if f ie > 0 on any edge, then the
marginal cost is Mˆ ie which is at most M i + 2nΨ2δ. Hence ~f is an 4nΨ2δ-equilibrium.
We now show that ~w is also close to the true value, i.e., for each player i, |wi −
GraphVali( ~M)| ≤ 4mδΨ4. Fix an edge e, and let S∗e be the set of players with positive flow
on edge e as defined by Algorithm GraphFlow. Further, let x∗e(Se) be the solution to
|Se|le(x) + xl′e(x) =
∑
i∈Se
M i ,
while x∗e(S∗e ) be the solution to
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|S∗e |le(x) + xl′e(x) =
∑
i∈S∗e
M i .
Let xˆe(Se) and xˆe(S∗e ) be similarly defined as the values returned by ̂BinSearch with error
parameter δ. Thus x∗e(S∗e ) is the flow on edge e as determined by Algorithm GraphFlow,
while |xˆe(Se)− x∗e(Se)| ≤ δ and |xˆe(S∗e )− x∗e(S∗e )| ≤ δ by Lemma 15.
We first show that Se ⊆ S∗e . Suppose for a contradiction that Se ⊃ S∗e . Then the |S∗e |+1th
player enters Se, but not S∗e . ThusM |S
∗
e |+1 > le(xˆe(S∗e ))+2nΨ2δ, whileM |S
∗
e |+1 ≤ le(x∗e(S∗e ),
which is a contradiction, since |le(xˆe(S∗e ))− le(xˆe(S∗e ))| is at most δΨ.
Thus Se ⊆ S∗e . Consider first the case that Se ⊂ S∗e . Then for the |Se|+ 1th player, since
it must have nonnegative flow as returned by GraphFlow, and because it does not belong to
Se,
le(x∗e(S∗e )) ≤M |S
∗
e |+1 ≤ le(xˆe(Se)) + 2nΨ2δ
and hence, |x∗e(S∗e )− xˆe(Se)| ≤ 2nΨ3δ. We note that x∗e(S∗e ) is the total flow returned by
GraphFlow on edge e, while xˆe(Se) is the total flow on edge e returned by ̂GraphFlow. Then
for any player i, the difference in flows on edge e returned by GraphFlow and ̂GraphFlow is
M i − le(x∗e(S∗e ))
l′e(x∗e(S∗e ))
−M
i − le(xˆe(Se))
l′e(xˆe(Se))
≥ M
i − le(xˆe(Se)) + 2nδΨ2
l′e(xˆe(Se))− 2nδΨ2
−M
i − le(xˆe(Se))
l′e(xˆe(Se))
≤ 4nδΨ5
Similarly, if Se = S∗e , then again |x∗e(S∗e )− xˆe(Se)| ≤ 2nΨ3δ, and the above bound holds
for the flow of any player on edge e. Hence, since the total change of any player’s flow on an
edge is at most 4nδΨ5, we get that for any player i, |wi −GraphVali( ~M)| ≤ 4mnδΨ5. J
Note that the algorithm could return a flow vector ~f that has some negative entries.
However, we can correct this in the following way. Suppose f ie < 0. Then it can be shown,
from the proof of Lemmas 17 and Claim 1, that |f ie| ≤ 4nΨ5δ. We set f ie = 0, and maintain
the total flow on edge e unchanged by reducing the flow of players on edge e that have
positive flow. This is possible since xˆe ≥ 0, and does not change the flow of any player by
much (at most 4n2Ψ5δ). We do this for all edges, setting to zero the flow of any player
with negative flow on any edge and decreasing the flow of other players to maintain the
total flow on each edge. We redefine the demands wi =
∑
e f
i
e for all players i, and note
that the demand of any player also does not change by more than 4mn2Ψ5δ in this process.
The resulting flow is nonnegative, with total flow on every edge unchanged. Further, it
can be shown that ~f is an 8n2Ψ6δ-equilibrium flow for demands ~w, and for all players i,
|wi −GraphVali( ~M)| ≤ 8mn2Ψ6δ.
I Lemma 18. Given a player k, and two marginal cost vectors ~M and ~M ′ that satisfy the
following properties:
1. for all players i < k, M i = M i′,
2. for all players i > k, | ̂GraphVali( ~M, δ)−GraphVali( ~M ′)| ≤ i.
Let wˆk = ̂GraphValk( ~M, δ), and w′k = GraphValk( ~M ′). If wˆk > w′k + 4mn2δΨ5 +
∑
i>k i,
then Mk > Mk′.
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Proof. Let Mk ≤ Mk′, and let P be the set of players {i ≥ k : M i ≤ M i′}. Thus k ∈ P .
We use the following property shown earlier in Lemma 8:
∑
i∈P
GraphVali( ~M) ≤
∑
i∈P
GraphVali( ~M ′) . (10)
The proof of this statement is exactly the same as in the earlier lemma. Further, we have
the following properties from Lemma 17:
∑
i∈P
̂GraphVali( ~M, δ) ≤
∑
i∈P
GraphVali( ~M) + 4mn2δΨ5 .
Together with (10), this gives us that
wˆk +
∑
i∈P,i6=k
̂GraphVali( ~M, δ) ≤ w′k +
∑
i∈P,i6=k
GraphVali( ~M) + 4mn2δΨ5 .
Since | ̂GraphVali( ~M, δ) − GraphVali( ~M ′)| ≤ i for all players i > k, this gives us that
wˆk ≤ w′k + 4mn2δΨ5 +
∑
i>k i as required. J
I Corollary 19. Given a player k, and two marginal cost vectors ~M and ~M ′ that satisfy the
following properties:
1. for all players i < k, M i = M i′,
2. for all players i > k, | ̂GraphVali( ~M, δ)−GraphVali( ~M ′)| ≤ i.
Let wˆk = ̂GraphValk( ~M, δ), and w′k = GraphValk( ~M ′). If Mk ≤ Mk
′ + δ1, then wˆk ≤
w′k + 6mn2(δ + δ1)Ψ4 +
∑
i>k i.
Proof. Consider the marginal cost vector ~N := ((M i)i≤k, (M i
′)i>k), obtained by replacing
the kth component of ~M ′ by Mk. Then since |Mk −Mk′| ≤ δ1, by Claim 3, for each player
i, |GraphVali( ~N)−GraphVali( ~M ′)| ≤ 2mnΨδ1. Further, for all players i > k,
| ̂GraphVali( ~M, δ)−GraphVali( ~N)| ≤ i + 2mnΨδ1 . (11)
Now consider marginal cost vectors ~N and ~M . The first k components in both are equal.
Using (11) and Lemma 8 gives us that
| ̂GraphValk( ~M, δ)−GraphValk( ~N)| ≤
∑
i>k
i+2mn2Ψδ1+4mn2Ψ5δ ≤
∑
i>k
i+4mn2Ψ5(δ+δ1) .
and hence, since |GraphVali( ~N)−GraphVali( ~M ′)| ≤ 2mnΨδ1, for all i,
| ̂GraphValk( ~M, δ)−GraphValk( ~M ′)| ≤
∑
i>k
i + 6mn2Ψ5(δ + δ1) .
J
I Lemma 20. For any vector (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) with each component in [0,Λ], the function
̂EqMCostk((M1, . . . ,Mk−1)) returns marginal costs (Mk, . . . ,Mn) for the remaining players
so that, for each player i ≥ k, ̂GraphVali(M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ [vi ± 2(n−k)6mn2Ψ5(δ + δ1)]. The
time taken is
O
(
mn2 log(2nΨ3/δ)
(
log(2Ψ2/δ1)
)n−k+1)
.
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Algorithm 7 ̂EqMCostk((M1, . . . ,Mk−1), δ)
Input: Vector (M1, . . . ,Mk−1), with each component M i ∈ [0,Λ], error parameter δ . If
i = 1, there is no input required.
Output: Vector ( ~M) of marginal costs so that the first k − 1 marginal costs are equal to
the inputs, and for players i ≥ k, the demand GraphVali( ~M) = vi.
1: if k = n then
2: Using binary search in [0,Λ], find M so that GraphValn((M i)i<n,M, δ) ∈ [vn ± δ].
3: return M
4: Low← 0, High← Λ
5: Mid← (Low + High)/2
6: (Mk+1, . . . ,Mn)← ̂EqMCostk+1((M1, . . . ,Mk−1,Mid), δ) . Call ̂EqMCostk+1 to get
marginal costs for the remaining player k+ 1, . . . , n so that the demand for these players
is correct
7: if ( ̂GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k, δ) ∈ [vk ± 2(n−k)6mn2Ψ5(δ + δ1)]) or (High −
Low ≤ δ/(2mΨ)) then
8: return (Mid, (M i)i>k)
9: else if ( ̂GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) > vk + 2(n−k)6mn2Ψ5(δ + δ1) then
10: High← Mid, goto 5
11: else if ( ̂GraphValk((M i)i<k,Mid, (M i)i>k) < vk − 2(n−k)6mn2Ψ5(δ + δ1) then
12: Low← Mid, goto 5
Proof. We will use the notation Nk−1 := (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) for the input vector of marginal
costs for the players 1, . . . , k − 1. The proof is by induction on n. In the base case, k = n,
and the input is the vector Nn−1 = (M1, . . . ,Mn−1) with each component in [0,Λ]. By
Claim 6, there exists M∗ so that GraphValn(Nn−1,M∗) = vn. Now consider the interval
[M∗ ± δ1]. For any Mˆ in this interval, it follows from Claim 3 that GraphValn(Nn−1, Mˆ) ∈
[vn±2mnΨδ1]. Further, from Lemma 17, ̂GraphValn(Nn−1, Mˆ , δ) ∈ [vn±2mnΨδ1 +4mδΨ4].
The contrapositive also holds true: if ̂GraphValn(Nn−1, Mˆ , δ) > vn + 2mnΨδ1 + 4mnδΨ5,
then Mˆ > M∗. Thus, M∗ must always be in the binary search interval, and the search
must terminate if the length of the search interval is at most δ1 with Mˆ that satisfies
̂GraphValn(Nn−1, Mˆ , δ) ∈ [vn ± 6mn2Ψ5(δ1 + δ)].
For the inductive step, we are given player k < n. We assume that given any input
vector Nk = (M1, . . . ,Mk) with each component in [0,Λ], ̂EqMCostk+1 returns marginal
costs (Mk+1, . . . ,Mn) for the remaining players so that for each of these remaining players
i ≥ k+ 1, ̂GraphVali(M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ [vi±2n−i6mn2Ψ5(δ1 + δ)]. We need to show that given
any input marginal costs Nk−1 = (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) for the first k − 1 players, ̂EqMCostk
finds marginal costs (Mk, . . . ,Mn) for players k onwards so that the demand returned for
these players i ≥ k by ̂GraphVali is in the interval [vi ± 2n−i6mn2Ψ4(δ1 + δ)].
Firstly, by Lemma 7, choosing S = [k, . . . , n] and wˆi = vi for players i ∈ S, there exist
marginal costs (M∗k, . . . ,M∗n) so that for all i ≥ k, GraphVali(Nk−1, (M∗i)i≥k) = vi. We
now show that the binary search procedure in ̂EqMCostk finds the required marginal cost
Mˆk. By the lemma, M∗k lies in the initial search interval [0,Λ]. Assume that in some
iteration, M∗k lies in the search interval [Low,High], and Mid = (Low + High)/2. By the
induction hypothesis, ̂EqMCostk+1(Nk−1,Mid) returns marginal costs (Mk+1, . . . ,Mn) for
the players k + 1, . . . , n so that for each of these players i ≥ k + 1 (but not player k),
̂GraphVali(Nk−1,Mid, (M i)i>k) ∈ [vi± 2n−i6mn2Ψ5(δ1 + δ)]. Further, for each player i ≥ k,
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GraphVali(Nk−1, (M∗i)i≥k) = vi. Suppose that for player k,
GraphValk(Nk−1,Mid, (M i)i>k) > vk + 2n−k6mn2Ψ5(δ1 + δ)
= vk + 6mn2Ψ5(δ1 + δ)
(
1 +
∑
i>k
2n−i
)
.
Then by Lemma 18, Mid > M∗k. In which case, the search procedure reduces the interval
to [Mid,High]. Hence M∗k is always within the search interval. Further, from Corol-
lary 19 and the induction hypothesis, if High − Low ≤ δ1, then ̂EqMCostk(Nk−1) returns
marginal costs (Mk, . . . ,Mn) for the remaining players so that, for each player i ≥ k,
̂GraphVali(M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ [vi ± 2(n−k)6mn2Ψ5(δ + δ1)]. J
Let ~f be an -equilibrium flow for ASRG Γ with demands ~w for the players, and let ~v be
a different vector of demands close to ~v so that ‖~v − ~w‖∞ ≤ ν. We now describe a simple
procedure to modify ~f to obtain ~g, which is an  + 6νΨ2-equilibrium for demands ~v. For
each i, if vi ≥ wi, we choose the edge on which player i has minimum marginal cost, and
increase player i’s flow so that gie = f ie + (vi − wi). If vi ≤ wi, on each edge e, we reduce
f ie on all edges while maintaining nonnegativity, until the total flow from player equals vi.
This gives us flow ~g. We note that (1) if gie > 0, then in flow f , Lie(f) ≥ mine′ Lie′(f)− , (2)
for any player i and edge e, |f ie − gie| ≤ ν, and (3) for any edge e, the total flow changes by
at most nν. The latter two properties are enough to establish that the change in marginal
cost for any player on an edge e |Lie(g)− Lie(fLie(~f)| ≤ 3mνΨ2, and combined with the first
property, this gives us that ~g is an + 6mνΨ2-equilibrium for flow values ~v.
From Lemma 20 and the above redistribution procedure, substituting ν = 4mδΨ4, we get
the required theorem.
I Theorem 21. Algorithm ̂EqMCost1(δ), combined with the redistribution procedure described
to change flow values from ~w to ~v, terminates in time
O
(
mn2 log(2nΨ3/δ)
(
log(2Ψ2/δ1)
)n−k+1)
,
and returns a 2n+5m2n2Ψ6δ-approximate equilibrium.
Thus, an -equilibrium can be obtained by this algorithm in time O
(
mn2 (log(nΨ/))n
)
.
A.2 A game with multiple equilibria
We first describe the construction of a two-player game on a six-edge network with non-
decreasing, nonnegative, convex, and continuously differentiable cost functions on the edges
that has exactly three equilibria, two of which are rational and one of which is irrational.
The game has two players b and r with demands vb = 4763.5 and vr = 2415.3 respectively.
The costs for the edges e1 and e5, and for e2 and e4 are same. The detailed cost functions
are given in the Table 2.
We now obtain some properties regarding equilibria in this ASRG, culminating in showing
that there are the three required equilibria. We will use the following notation to denote the
paths in game T :
P1 is path e1 − e4
P2 is path e2 − e5
P3 is path e1 − e3 − e5
P4 is path e6.
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e1 e2
e3
e4 e5
e6
t
s
Figure 4 ASRG T , with multiple equilibria
Table 2 cost functions of ASRG T with multiple equilibria
Edge Delay Function
e1, e5

0.1694x+ 293.1103 x ≤ 599
329219x2−394202776x+118472907676
1190000 599 < x < 599 +
119
173
0.55x+ 65 x ≥ 599 + 119173
e2 , e4 0.02x+ 670
e3 0.06x+ 208
e6

36588331
303185000x+
993797009
606370000 x ≤ 27824546
11040x−18059920
66617 x ≥ 110285040380376111819515107546
αx2 − βx+ γ otherwise
α 827658806647032986535529456723902937873797726820000
β 9957574988143115788690556303456723902937873797726820000
γ 1211326285098217890029092777873211826895611751495190907280000
We first show that at equilibrium, for each player, the flow on edges e1 and e5 are equal,
as are the flow on edges e2 and e4. Note that the cost functions on these edges is also the
same. We also show that at any equilibrium, both players have non-zero flow on path P4
consisting of edge 6.
I Lemma 22. If f is an equilibrium flow of ASRG T shown in Figure 4, then for each
player i ∈ {b, r}, (1) f i1 = f i5, (2) f i2 = f i4, and (3) f i6 > 0.
Proof. (1) and (2): Assume contradiction. Suppose f1 ≥ f5 and f b1 > f b5 ≥ 0. Observe that,
this implies f4 > f2 and f b4 > f b2 ≥ 0. Therefore, LbP1 > LbP2 . Since, flow of player b on path
P1(f b1 > 0 and f b4 > 0), we get LbP1 ≤ LbP2 which is a contradiction. The other cases can be
argued similarly. This proves first two parts of the Lemma. (3): Suppose f b6 = 0. Therefore,
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marginal cost of player b on edge e6 is
LbP4(f) = l6(f6)
≤ l6(vr)
≈ 293.12.
It can be seen from Table 2 that the cost on edges e1 = e5, e2 = e4 and e3 with zero flow
(i.e., the constant term for the cost functions) is 293.1103, 670 and 208 respectively. Hence,
the marginal costs of any player on paths P1, P2 and P3 are ≈ 963.1103, ≈ 963.1103 and
≈ 2684.93 respectively. All of these are much larger than LbP1(f), hence player b cannot
be using any of these paths either giving us a contradiction. The case for player r follows
similarly. J
By the lemma, given the flow values of players b and r on edges e1 and e2, then the flows
on other edges can be calculated easily since vb and vr are known. Therefore, from now on
we will consider the flows as shown in Figure 5. The variables x1, x2 correspond to the flow
of player b and y1, y2 correspond to the flow of player r. Observe that x2 ≥ x1 and y2 ≥ y1,
since the flow on edge e3 is non-negative.
(x2, y2)(x1, y1)
(x1, y1)(x2, y2)
(x1 − x2, y1 − y2)
(vb − x2 − x1, vr − y2 − y1)
e1 e2
e3
e4 e5
e6
t
s
Figure 5 Flows in T .
I Lemma 23. The ASRG T has three equilibria f , g, and h such that f and g are rational
equilibria, while h is an irrational equilibria. That is, in h, there exists an edge e and a
player i with hie irrational.
Proof. For the proof of the lemma, we will first argue that every equilibrium is a common
zero of a set of polynomials arising from the equilibrium conditions of players. Then, we
enumerate over all the possible zeros to check if they satisfy all the equilibrium conditions
(this is done by Mathematica).
By Lemma 22, we know that f bP4 > 0 and f
r
P4
> 0. Combining this with flow conservation
as shown in Figure 5, we get the following conditions at any equilibrium:
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LbP4(f) ≤ LbP1(f), x2 ≥ 0, (12)
LbP4(f) ≤ LbP3(f), x1 ≥ x2, (13)
LrP4(f) ≤ LrP1(f), y2 ≥ 0, (14)
LrP4(f) ≤ LrP3(f), y1 ≥ y2. (15)
Observe that at equilibrium, for each of (12), (13),(14) and (15), at least one of the two
inequalities must be tight. For example if x1 > 0 and x2 = 0, then LbP4(f) ≤ LbP1(f) and
LbP4(f) = L
b
P3
(f). Therefore, at any equilibrium flow, for each player we have two equalities
and two inequalities depending on the values of x1, x2, y1 and y2. Since our cost functions
are piece-wise polynomials of degree ≤ 3, with x1, x2, y1 and y2 as variables, the equalities
are polynomial equations with degree ≤ 3.
Therefore, values of x1, x2, y1 and y2 such that the flow is an equilibrium of T , are subset
of common zeros of polynomial equations with degree ≤ 3. We will enumerate over all the
possible common zeros of polynomial equations and show that there are 3 equilibrium flows
for ASRG T among with one is an irrational equilibrium (with irrational amount of flow on
edges) and other two are rational equilibrium.
In order to check for equilibria, we consider 9×16 = 144 possible states for the flows. The
states are obtained as follows. Firstly, the cost functions for edges e1, e5 and e6 are made up
of three piecewise functions. Since the flow on e1 and e5 is always equal by Lemma 22, we
get 9 states, depending on which piece of the cost function is used in equilibrium calculation.
The notation state (i, j) is used for the state when calculations are using the ith piece of
cost functions on edges 1 and 5, and jth piece of edge on edge 6.
Further, for each state, each of the two players could use any subset (including the empty
set) of the set of paths {P1, P3}. Note that by Lemma 22, both players must use path P4 at
equilibrium, and they use P2 iff they use P1. Thus each player has four options, giving us 16
options for the equilibrium flow within each state. This gives us a total of 144 possible states
to check for equilibria.
Each state gives us a different set of polynomial equalities and inequalities. For each
state, we obtain the common zeros of polynomials by finding Groebner basis5, which allows
us to more easily calculate the set of common zeros by solving the polynomials one after
another independently, in a manner similar to Gaussian elimination. We then verify that
the solution thus obtained to the polynomial equalities satisfies the inequalities, and also
that the flow is correct for the particular state it is computed in. More details are provied in
Sections A.3 and A.4. By checking over all the possible states, we get that there are three
possible equilibria:
Flow g for State (1,1) - case x2 = x1 > 0, y1 > 0, y2 = 0,
Flow f for State (3,3) - case x2 = x1 > 0, y1 > 0, y2 = 0,
Irrational Equilibrium flow h for State(2,2) - case x2 = x1 > 0, y1 > 0, y2 = 0.
The exact values of x1, x2, y1 and y2 for these equilibria are given in the Mathematica
file “Flows.nb". In Section A.4, we describe in detail how to verify that these three are the
only equilibria using Mathematica. Source files are available on author’s webpage. J
5 A very brief introduction to Gröbner bases is given in Section A.3.
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Figure 6 ASRG G, with multiple equilibria
We now modify ASRG T slightly to obtain G (Figure 6), which will be used next in the
construction of the ASRG for the reduction. We will show in Lemma 24 that the properties
of equilibria in G and T are almost identical.
For ASRG G, the cost functions on edges 1, 2, 3, 5 are identical to T . The cost function
on edge 4 of T is however one more than the sum of the cost functions on edges 4, 7, and 8
in G, as follows:
le4(x) = 0.01x+ 669.5, le7(x) = le8(x) = 0.005x,
le6(x) =

36588331
303185000x+
993797009
606370000 − θx− 50θ x ≤ 27824546
11040x−18059920
66617 − θx− 50θ x ≥ 110285040380376111819515107546
αx2 − βx+ γ − θx− 50θ otherwise
where θ = 4/300.
le9(x) = 2x/300,
le10(x) = 2x/300.
where α, β, γ are same as in Table 2. This describes the cost functions on the edges of G.
There are now 4 players, b, r, p and q. Again, for players b and r, the demands are the same
as earlier: vb = 4763.5 and vr = 2415.3. Players p and q have demand of 100 units and by
construction has can send their demand through a single path i.e., sp-tp path and sq − tq
respectively.
I Lemma 24. The ASRG G shown in Figure 6 has 3 equilibria f , g, and h that are identical
to the equilibrium flows in T .
Proof. We will show the result for player p and proof for q is quite similar. Suppose f is an
equilibrium flow for ASRG T and g is an equilibrium flow for ASRG G. Before proceeding
further, observe the following:
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The network of ASRG G is very similar to that of T except e4 in T is replaced by
e4 − e7 − e8 in G and e6 in T is replaced by e6 − e9 − e10 in G.
The cost functions on edges e1, e2, e3, e5 for G and T are identical.
In ASRG G, player p sends 100 units of flow from sp to tp via edges o− e7− o′ and player
q sends 100 units of flow from sq to tq via edges r − e9 − r′. Since players p and q can
send their flow only via one path, their equilibrium conditions are always satisfied.
The marginal cost of player b on edge e4 in ASRG T is
Le4(f) = le4(f) + f be4 l
′
e4(f)
= 0.02(f be4 + f
r
e4) + 670 + 0.02(f
b
e4)
= 0.04(f be4) + 0.02(f
r
e4) + 670.
Similarly marginal cost of player b on sub path e7 − e4 − e8 in G is
Le4(g) + Le7(g) + Le8(g) = 0.04(gbe4) + 0.02(g
r
e4) + 670.
Therefore, as far as player b is concerned his equilibrium conditions are same in T and G,
provided the flows are same on other edges. Therefore, his equilibrium conditions on any
path in game G are same to that of T . Similarly one can show that the same of player r.
By Lemma 23, there are three solutions which satisfy the equilibrium conditions of T .
Therefore, there are three equilibria for ASRG G out of which two are rational equilibria and
one is an irrational equilibrium.
Therefore, equilibrium flows for player b and r are same in both the games G and T
except for the edges e4, e7, e8. But, the flow values on these edges can be calculated easily
once the flows on other edges are known. So, we will denote the equilibrium flows in both
the games by f, g and h as far as the players b and r are concerned. J
The equilibrium flows(with approximate values) for the game G are given in Table 3. The
exact values are given in the file “Flows.nb" attached.
Table 3 Equilibrium flows for ASRG G accurate up to 2 decimals
Edge f g h
b r b r b r
e1 500 100 540 50 527.41 71.78
e2 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e3 0 100 0 50 0 71.78
e4 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e5 500 100 540 50 527.41 71.78
e6 3763.5 2315.30 3683.5 2365.30 3708.69 2343.54
e7 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e8 500 0 540 0 527.41 0
e9 3763.5 2315.30 3683.5 2365.30 3708.69 2343.54
e10 3763.5 2315.30 3683.5 2365.30 3708.69 2343.54
The following claim will be later used to show that there exists an equilibrium where
players p and q have cost at most C iff the given set S satisfies SUBSET-SUM.
I Claim 8. For game G we have
Cpe7(f) + C
q
e9(f) = C
p
e7(g) + C
q
e9(g).
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Proof. Let f7 be the sum amount of flow on edge e7 by players b and r. Similarly g7, f9
and g9 are defined. Now recall that le7(x) = 0.005x and le9(x) = 2x/300 and vp = vq = 100.
Now observe that
Cpe7(g)− Cpe7(f) = 100 {le7(100 + g7)− le7(100 + f7)}
= 0.5(40)
= 20.
Similarly, it can be seen that Cqe9(f)− Cqe9(g) = 20. Hence the claim. J
A.3 Groebner Basis
Consider the ring of polynomials of n variables over field K, K[x1, x2, . . . , xn]. If F =
{p1, p2, . . . , pk} is set of polynomials, then the ideal generated by F is
〈F〉 = {p1q1 + p2q2 + . . .+ pkqk|q1, q2, . . . , qk ∈ K[x1, x2, . . . , xn]} .
The variety of F is the set of all common zeros of all the polynomials in F i.e.,
V(F) = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ∈ Kn|p(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 0,∀p ∈ F}.
Given an ideal generated by polynomials 〈F〉, Groebner basis for the 〈F〉 is the set
of polynomials g1, g2, . . . , gt such that they generate 〈F〉, with some desirable algorithmic
properties. This is encapsulated by the following Lemma.
I Lemma 25. [8] If G is the Groebner basis of 〈F〉, then
V(F) = V(G).
Therefore, to find the common zeros of polynomials in F , it is enough to find the Groebner
basis of F and then finding the common zeros of the Groebner basis. One big advantage we
have by finding the Groebner basis, is that one can easily calculate the set of common zeros
of polynomials by solving the polynomials one after another independently. For example,
if p1[x1, x2, . . . , xn], p2[x1, x2, . . . , xn], . . ., pn[x1, x2, . . . , xn] are the polynomials, then the
corresponding Groebner basis are the polynomials g1[x1], g2[x1, x2],. . ., gn[x1, x2, . . . , xn].
Then one can solve g1[x1] = 0 to get the roots of g1. Then we will substitute each of the
root for x1 in g2[x1, x2] and then solve for the roots of the corresponding polynomials. We
will continue this process till the end to get the set of all common zeros of the polynomials.
We give an example of this in Section A.4.
Remark: A very concise introduction to Groebner basis is given by Bernd Sturmfels
[28]. The method of solving the polynomials by reducing to Groebner basis can be found in
Chapter 2 of [8].
A.4 Verifying Equilibria
Before going further, recall that the cost functions for edges e1, e5 and e6 are made up of
three piecewise functions. Therefore, depending on the amount of flow on each edge, the
cost is calculated with the corresponding piecewise function. We will denote this using states
1, 2, 3 as shown in the Figure 7. By Lemma 22, the flow on edges e1 and e5 is identical, hence
there are 9 possible states. We will first give an example to check the equilibrium conditions
for one of the possible cases. Later we will give an outline of how to use the Mathematica
files provided to check over all the possible cases.
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Figure 7 Possible equilibrium flows for T .
Consider the case for which the flow is such that both the edges e1 and e6 are in state 1
which we will denote as STATE(1, 1) and x2 = x1 > 0, y1 > 0, y2 = 0. The corresponding
equilibrium conditions are
130599901x1 + 43973935y1 − 72722643290 = 0
x2 = x1
y2 = 0
87947870x1 + 157498509y1 − 55366775250 = 0.
The Groebner basis for the above set of polynomials is
y1 − 50 = 0
x2 = x1
y2 = 0
x1 − 540 = 0.
This corresponds to one of the possible equilibrium flows. Before going further, observe
that for each possible STATE(i, j)i,j∈{1,2,3}, there are 16 possible types of flows. This can
be seen easily since x1 ≥ x2 ≥ 0, there are four possible types flows for player b namely
x1 = x2 = 0, x1 > x2 = 0, x1 = x2 > 0 and x1 > x2 > 0. Similarly there are 4 possible
types of flows for player r and so potentially an equilibrium flow can be any of those 16 cases.
Therefore, for each state, we will consider these 16 types of flows and check if the equilibrium
is possible or not.
Now we will give step by step instructions to verify each case. In the attached zip folder
there are 9 files named (“STATE i, j.nb)i,j∈{1,2,3} corresponding to each possible state. In
each such file we will check the existence in all the possible 16 cases for the corresponding
state. Follow the following instructions to compile the Mathematica files.
1. Evaluate(run) “Functions.nb". One can evaluate the Mathematica file by Evaluation→
EvaluateNotebook.
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Table 4 Description of Mathematica files
File Description
Functions.nb Defines all the cost functions along with other relevant data.
Flows.nb Contains the values for the possible equilibria for game T .
STATE i, j.nb for i, j ≤ 3 Checks the feasiblity of equilibrium conditions for STATE(i,j)
2. Evaluate the interested (“STATE i, j.nb)i,j∈{1,2,3} to check the possible cases.
Remark: Before evaluating “Functions.nb", the notebook should be changed to Global
context by Evaluation → Notebook′s Default Context → Global‘. There are further
comments in “Functions.nb" and STATE 1,1.nb files.
Further explanation can be found in “Functions.nb" and “STATE 1,1.nb" files.
By checking over all the possible cases, we get that there are three possible equilibria
corresponding
Flow g for State(1,1) - case x2 = x1 > 0, y1 > 0, y2 = 0,
Flow f for State(3,3) - case x2 = x1 > 0, y1 > 0, y2 = 0,
Irrational Equilibrium flow h for State(2,2) - case x2 = x1 > 0, y1 > 0, y2 = 0.
The exact values of x1, x2, y1 and y2 for these equilibria are given in the Mathematica
file “Flows.nb".
